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Abstract
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In this paper, Arbache, Go, and Page examine the recent 
acceleration of growth in Africa. Unlike the past, the 
performance is now registered broadly across several 
types of countries—particularly the oil-exporting and 
resource-intensive countries and, in more recent years, 
the large- and middle-income economies, as well as 
coastal and low-income countries. The analysis confirms 
a trend break in the mid-1990s, identifying a growth 
acceleration that is due not only to favorable terms of 
trade and greater aid, but also to better policy. Indeed, 
the growth diagnostics show that more and more African 
countries have been able to avoid mistakes with better 
macropolicy, better governance, and fewer conflicts; 
This paper—a product of the  Office of the Chief Economist, Africa Region—is part of a larger effort in the department 
to examine the recent acceleration of growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, its underlying factors and sustainability. Policy 
Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at dgo@
worldbank.org.  
as a result, the likelihood of growth decelerations has 
declined significantly. Nonetheless, the sustainability of 
that growth is fragile, because economic fundamentals, 
such as savings, investment, productivity, and export 
diversification, remain stagnant. The good news in the 
story is that African economies appear to have learned 
how to avoid the mistakes that led to the frequent growth 
collapses between 1975 and 1995. The bad news is that 
much less is known about the recipes for long-term 
success in development, such as developing the right 
institutions and the policies to raise savings and diversify 











There is something decidedly different and new about the economic landscape of Sub-
Saharan Africa (Africa or the region hereafter). After stagnating for much of 45 years, 
economic performance in Africa is markedly improving. In recent years, for example, 
GDP growth in SSA is accelerating to its strongest point at about 6 percent a year while 
inflation registered below two-digit level, its lowest point.  The much improved economic 
performance is confirmed by several recent assessments.
2 
 
Although the current economic growth is still short-lived relative to Africa’s long 
history of growth crisis and is certainly nowhere close to the standard of East Asia, it is 
nonetheless noteworthy and a cause for guarded optimism. The performance at least calls 
for a closer examination. Several interesting questions can immediately be raised: Is 
Africa finally overcoming the challenges of growth and poverty to claim the 21st century, 
as posed, for example, by Gelb et al. (2000), Collier (2007), and Ndulu et al. (2007)? In 
particular, is there indeed a turning point? How widespread are the recent gains among 
the 47 countries in the region? What are the key factors underlying the recent 
improvements in Africa’s economic performance? Why have the recent oil price 
increases not dampened its growth performance? Is the growth robust and supported by 
improvements in the economic fundamentals? What major risks and challenges remain? 
Will Africa attain the Millennium Development Goals by 2015?  
 
The rest of the paper looks at these questions and is organized as follows. The 
recent acceleration of growth in Africa is discussed in the next section. Then, the growth 
diagnostics in the following section carefully examine the differences since 1995, the 
likely causes and robustness of the recent growth. The paper then looks at the key actions 
                                                 
1 This paper will appear in a revised form in Africa at a Turning Point? Growth, Aid and External Shocks, 
edited by Delfin Go and John Page (forthcoming), Africa Development Essay Series, The World Bank.  We 
thank Betty P. Dow, Cristina Savescu, and Xiao Ye for excellent research assistance. 
 
2These assessments include AfDB and OECD (2007); AFRCE (various years); EIU (2007); IMF (2007a, 
2007b); and World Bank (2007a, 2007b, 2007d). AFRCE briefs, from which much of this paper is derived, 
are biannual economic briefs prepared by the Chief Economist Office of the Africa Region at the World 
Bank. The briefs cover recent economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, issues about the scaling up of 
foreign aid, and the effect of external shocks. In addition, the papers by Arbache and Page cited in section 3 
are key sources of the growth analysis. 
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that are necessary to promote and sustain growth and discusses why growth should be 
shared. The paper concludes by summarizing Sub-Saharan Africa’s economic prospects. 
 
 
II.  The Recent Acceleration of Growth in Africa 
 
Is the growth failure in Sub-Saharan Africa finally reversing? An upward shift in the 
recent growth rates suggests that a trend break may have taken place around the mid-
1990s.
3 Annual GDP growth was a sluggish 2.9 percent in the 1980s and 1.7 percent 
during 1990–94. Since 1994, however, the pace of economic expansion has approached 
the threshold of moderate growth of 5 percent a year. Even if the record is measured 
more conservatively with regard to per capita income, the shift is perceptible: relative to 
its prolonged stagnation or contraction, per capita income grew by 1.6 percent a year in 
the late 1990s and by 2.1 percent to 3.0 percent a year since 2000. Despite the recent oil 
price shock, growth has remained good. From 2004 to 2006, the annual growth in GDP 
and per capita income, when weighted by each country’s GDP, approaches 6 and 4 
percent, respectively. Although improvement in aggregate output does not necessarily 
indicate broad economic development of the region, the current growth episode has 
nonetheless lasted 12 years altogether, a period that is neither trivial nor brief.  
 
In fact, average incomes in Africa have been rising in tandem with those in other 
regions (figure 1). The top performers in Africa are doing very well compared with fast-




Figure 1: African per capita income  
relative to other developing countries 
 
Figure 2: Africa's five fastest growing economies 




Source: World Bank various years g.  Source: World Bank various years g. 
 
 
A.  How widespread is the current growth acceleration?  
                                                 
3 We test the statistical significance of this hypothesis in the growth analysis of the next section.   3
 
The recent economic expansion seems to be registering across an increasing number of 
countries (figure 3). The number of countries with economic declines dropped from 15 to 
18 in the early 1990s to about 2 to 5 countries in recent years. Only one country has 
significant economic contraction—Zimbabwe.
4 In contrast, about 40–45 countries have 
positive growth, and 14–19 countries are growing by more than 5 percent a year. 
 
 
Figure 3: Growth Pattern of African Countries 
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During 2000–06, about 26 countries had GDP growth exceeding 4 percent a year, 
while as many as 14 countries exceeded 5.5 percent. Countries with at least 4 percent 
GDP growth now constitute a sizable portion of Sub-Saharan Africa—about 70 percent 
of the region’s total population and 80 percent of the region’s GDP. As a group, these 
countries have been growing consistently at nearly 7 percent a year, whether considered 
in the more recent period or a longer period since the mid-1990s. The classification of 
countries in table 1 is fairly stable in the two time periods. There are some exceptions 
near the cut-off point: the performance of São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, South 
Africa, and Zambia has improved in performance during the more recent period (2004–






                                                 
4 This assessment does not include Somalia, where no good data are available, and the numbers for Sudan 
may not fully cover its southern regions. Both current and past data face the same limitations. 
   4
Table 1: GDP Growth Rates for Individual Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa
1 
Countries with GDP Growth > 4%, 2000-06  Countries with GDP Growth < 4%, 2000-06 
(70% of SSA Population)  (30% of SSA Population) 
(78% of SSA GDP)  (22% of SSA GDP) 










             
Equatorial Guinea  23.1  36.2 Mauritius  3.9 4.4
Sierra Leone  11.6  1.7 Cameroon  3.7 4.1
Chad 10.9  7.4 Kenya  3.6 3.3
Angola 10.6  9.8 Niger  3.5 3.6
Liberia 8.9  12.1
*  Lesotho 3.4 3.2
Mozambique 7.6  7.9 Madagascar  3.2 3.2
Sudan 7.3  5.8 Guinea  2.8 3.6
Tanzania 6.3  5.2 Congo,  Democratic Republic of  2.6 0.6
Ethiopia 6.2  5.7 Malawi  2.6 4.4
Burkina Faso  6.1  6.6 Comoros  2.4 2.2
Cape Verde  5.7  6.9 Swaziland  2.4 2.8
Nigeria 5.6  4.4 Burundi  2.2 0.3
Uganda 5.6  6.4 Togo  1.7 2.3
Rwanda 5.5  9.7 Eritrea  1.3 2.6
Botswana 5.3  6.3 Guinea-Bissau  1.2 0.3
Ghana 5.0  4.8 Gabon  1.1 1.4
São Tomé and Príncipe  5.0  3.7 Central African Republic  0.2 1.1
Mauritania 4.9  4.6 Seychelles  0.1 2.3
Gambia, The  4.9  4.6 Côte d'Ivoire  -0.3 2.0
Congo, Republic of  4.9  3.6 Zimbabwe  -5.5 -2.6
Mali  4.9  5.1        
Zambia  4.8  3.4      Average  1.8 2.3
Namibia  4.5  4.1        
Benin  4.2  4.6        
South Africa  4.1  3.5        
Senegal  4.1  4.3        
               
     Average  6.8  6.9        
 Source: World Bank World Development Indicators database. 
1The cut-off point of 4 percent is based primarily on the performance during 2000-06. Somalia is not included for lack of data. At the World 
Bank, Djibouti is classified as part of Middle East and not part of Sub-Saharan Africa.         




B.  Performance by different types of countries   
 
Nonetheless, the range of growth among individual countries can vary widely, anywhere 
from −5.5 percent to a high of 23.1 percent. Alternative taxonomies of countries are often 
necessary to characterize the growth story better. Table 2 presents the growth 
performance for frequently used country groups for the 1980s, the 1990s, and the more 
recent periods. The numbers show that, unlike the past, the recent acceleration of growth 
is broadly registered across different types of countries.    5
An immediate issue in characterizing group performances is the choice of central 
tendencies. Population weights are best if the desired reference is the typical African in 
the group. If the typical country and its representative economic experience and policies 
are the targets as in this analysis, simple averages are more appropriate to give equal 
weights to individual countries.
5 This method is used to characterize growth in table 2. 
The overall regional growth is, however, also presented by weighted average by GDP.  
 
Large Countries.  Nigeria and South Africa are the two largest economies in Sub-
Saharan Africa, accounting for almost half the regional GDP and one-fourth the 
population. Their slow growths in the past have tended to pull down any regional growth 
averages, especially if GDP weights were used. However, as may be seen in table 2, the 
growth performance of Nigeria and South Africa has improved significantly since 2000. 
During 2004–06 in particular, their GDP growth reached about 6.2 and 5.0 percent a year, 
respectively. The rest of Sub-Saharan Africa continued to do better at 6.5 percent a year 
during 2004–06. The weighted average (about 6 percent) for the whole region is better 
than its simple average (about 5 percent) for the same period, which suggests that large 
countries in general are doing well. 
 
Oil Exporting Countries.   Higher oil prices since 2000 now directly benefit eight 
countries where net oil exports make up 30 percent or more of total exports: Angola, 
Cameroon, Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria, and Sudan. 
Côte d’Ivoire is also producing oil, but its net exports of oil are still low. Angola and 
Nigeria are the largest oil exporters, accounting for about 20 percent and 53 percent, 
respectively, of Africa’s total oil exports. As a group, the oil exporters represent about 25 
and 29 percent of Africa’s GDP and population, respectively.  Moreover, fuel now makes 
up about 40 percent of Africa’s total merchandise exports. 
 
Partly as a result of the recent higher oil prices, real GDP growth in oil-exporting 
countries accelerated to about 8.4 percent a year during 2000–06. This growth represents 
the strongest economic expansion among the possible country groupings shown in table 
2. Growth during the 1990s was also significant at 5.9 percent a year.  
 
Oil Importing Countries by Endowment and Location.   Although growth in oil-
importing countries lagged behind the regional average, it has also been improving, 
reaching 4.7 percent during 2004–06. This group is large and diverse, encompassing the 
majority of African countries and a wide range of characteristics. For digging deeper, the 
classification of countries by endowment and location, as suggested by Collier and 
O’Connell (2006), is useful. Countries are grouped in a nonoverlapping way as non-oil 
resource-intensive countries, coastal, and landlocked countries.
6 
                                                 
5 If there is any pattern growth, small countries in the resource-rich groups (oil and non-oil) tend to benefit 
more from higher commodity prices and additional revenue than larger countries in the groups. As a result, 
simple averages will tend to be higher than weighted averages. The reverse pattern between simple and 
weighted averages seems to be the case in countries that are not rich in resources. 
6 Strictly speaking, oil-exporting and oil-importing countries may belong to two or more subgroups 
simultaneously. For purposes of describing the performance, however, the classification is not overlapping, 
so that the subgroups add up to 100 percent. Collier (2007) and Collier and O’Connell (2006) also argue 
that oil and non-oil resource endowments are dominant characteristics relative to the others.   6
Table 2: Real GDP growth in Sub-Saharan Africa 
1980-2006 Recent  Periods 
Since 
mid-90s  Categories of countries 
1980~1989 1990~1999 2000~2006 2000~2003 2004~2006 2007
* 1995-2006 
  I.  Sub-Saharan Africa               
  A. Regional simple average  2.9  3.3  4.6  4.3  5.1  5.3  4.9 
           w/o  Zimbabwe  2.9 3.3 4.9 4.5 5.3  5.6 5.0 
  B. Regional weighted average  2.3  2.1  4.6  3.9  5.9  6.1  4.1 
           Nigeria  1.7  2.8  5.6  5.2  6.2  7.3  4.4 
           South Africa  2.2  1.4  4.1  3.4  5.0  5.0  3.5 
           Rest of SSA   2.7  2.5  4.9  4.0  6.5  6.1  5.1 
          
 II.  Oil Exporting Countries  3.5 5.9 8.4 8.4 8.4  8.2 9.1 
                  
III.  Oil Importing Countries  2.8 2.7 4.1 3.7 4.7  5.0 4.1 
  A.  By endowment & location                 
        Resource intensive countries  3.2  1.3  5.7  6.1  5.1  4.9  3.8 
        Costal countries  2.9  3.4  3.8  3.4  4.4  5.0  4.3 
        Landlocked countries  2.9  2.5  3.0  2.1  4.2  4.3  3.6 
 B.  By income level & fragile states                 
        Middle income countries  5.6  4.5  3.7  3.5  4.0  4.7  4.2 
        Low income countries  2.1  3.5  4.9  4.3  5.6  6.1  5.2 
        Fragile countries  2.2  0.5  2.8  2.4  3.2  3.6  2.5 
          
IV.  Regional Groups               
        EAC  3.4  3.9  5.1  4.5  6.0  6.4  5.0 
        SADC  3.6  2.6  4.0  3.1  5.2  5.7  4.0 
      CFA franc zone  2.8  4.9  4.9  5.1  4.7  4.3  5.9 
              WAEMU  2.1  3.5  3.2  2.9  3.5  4.0  3.6 
              CEMAC  3.8  6.8  7.3  8.0  6.4  4.7  9.0 
        ECOWAS  2.4  2.8  4.7  4.8  4.5  5.2  4.4 
        ECCAS  2.8  3.6  6.3  6.0  6.9  6.6  7.1 
        COMESA  3.0  2.3  3.5  2.4  5.0  5.8  3.8 
        IOC  2.9  3.5  2.4  2.1  2.9  5.1  3.0 
           
 V. Others          
       Flexible exchange rate regime  2.3  2.4  5.1  4.3  6.1  7.1  5.1 
       Fixed exchange rate regime  3.5  3.9  4.3  4.3  4.4  4.1  5.1 
       MDRI  2.1  2.7  5.3  5.1  5.6  6.0  5.0 
Source: World Bank WDI, ADI and  IMF WEO database.  All statistics are annual percent rates and simple averages unless otherwise mentioned. 
*Estimates based on AFRCE briefs, World Bank GEP, and IMF (2007). 
Notes :   ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States;                             WAEMU: West Africa Monetary Union of the CFA franc zone; 
              CEMAC: Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa;                  ECCAS: Economic Community of Central African States; 
              SADC: Southern African Development Community ;                                      COMESA: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa; 
              EAC: East African Community;                                                                        IOC: Indian Ocean Commission.   7
The six non-oil resource-intensive countries represent roughly 4.9 percent of 
Africa’s GDP and 4.2 percent of its population.
7 Like the oil exporters, the group also did 
very well relative to its own past performance: 5.1 percent during 2000–06 or 5.7 percent 
since 2000. 
 
The 19 coastal countries account for about 53 percent of the regional GDP and 32 
percent of the total population.
8 This group has been growing by 3.4 percent a year since 
2000—a rate that has further improved to 4.4 percent a year during 2004–06. 
 
The 13 landlocked countries were traditionally the laggards in growth.
9 Although 
they represent as much as 32 percent of the total population in the region, they take up 
only 17 percent of the regional income. Annual growth in GDP since 2000 has averaged 
only 3 percent but has improved to 4.2 percent recently. The individual records are 
mixed. Although the group includes noted growth failures such as the Central African 
Republic and Zimbabwe, it nonetheless has several bright spots, as reported in table 1: 
Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Mali, Rwanda, and Uganda. 
 
Oil Importing Countries by Income and Fragile States.  An alternative 
classification of the oil-importing countries is by income level and fragile states—that is, 
low- and middle-income countries plus fragile states. The International Monetary Fund, 
(IMF) for example, has used this classification (see IMF 2007a).
10 
 
The eight middle-income countries correspond to less than 8 percent of the 
region’s total population but to 40 percent of regional income.
11 South Africa alone 
represents 6.3 percent of the population and 35 percent of Africa’s GDP. The individual 
performances in this group have been mixed: whereas South Africa’s performance has 
been improving in recent periods, that of others (such as the Seychelles, Swaziland, and 
to some extent Mauritius) has slowed down. Zimbabwe, which used to be in this group, is 
now a fragile low-income country. As a result of the mixed performance of several 
countries, average growth for the group has fallen slightly from the 1980s and 1990s. 
However, growth during 2004–06 has again rebounded to about 4 percent a year. 
 
Fifteen countries may be classified as low income and non–oil exporting.
12 They 
are home to 45 percent of the total population but only 25 percent of the total income in 
the region. However, the recent performance of the group is heartening: growth has been 
                                                 
7 These countries are Botswana, Guinea, Namibia, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, and Zambia. 
8 These countries are Benin, Cape Verde, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Eritrea, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-
Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Senegal, the Seychelles, South 
Africa, Tanzania, and Togo. 
9 These countries are Burkina Faso, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Swaziland, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. 
10 The classification, like that of oil-importing countries by endowment and location, is not overlapping 
(see footnote 6). 
11 These countries are Botswana, Cape Verde, Lesotho, Mauritius, Namibia, the Seychelles, South Africa, 
and Swaziland. 
12 These countries are Benin, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.   8
steadily improving, from 2.1 percent a year in the 1980s to 3.5 percent in the 1990s and 
4.9 percent since 2000. In recent years, growth has been approaching 5.6 percent 
annually. The top performers in this group include Ghana, Mozambique, Senegal, and 
Tanzania plus the bright spots mentioned for landlocked countries: Burkina Faso, 
Ethiopia, Mali, Rwanda, and Uganda. 
 
Fragile states without significant oil resources—14 countries—still account for 
18 percent of the total population and 10 percent of total income in the region.
13 For the 
most part, GDP growth in this group is stuck at less than 2.5 percent, but it improved to 
3.2 percent during 2004–06. The challenges faced by this group are many and daunting, 
as has been portrayed persuasively by sources such as Collier (2007) and the World Bank 
(2007b, 2007c). Even so, there are hopeful signs; a few countries have managed to turn 
around at least their output growth (as reported in table 1): The Gambia, Liberia, São 
Tomé and Príncipe, and Sierra Leone. 
 
Regional  Groupings. There are several overlapping regional groupings in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Among those presented in table 1.2, the East Africa Community 
(EAC),
14 the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa
 (CEMAC),
15 and the 
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)
16 did the best, at 6.0, 6.4, and 
6.9 percent, respectively, during 2004–06. The Southern African Development 
Community (SADC)
17 and the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS)
18 did as well as the regional average in recent years. Regional groups below 
the African average include the western part of the franc zone—the West African 
Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)—and the island economies in the Indian 
Ocean Commission.




In sum, there is therefore evidence that economic growth is accelerating and 
registering across several types of countries, not just oil-exporting and resource-rich 
countries, but also oil-importing, landlocked, and—to some extent—fragile countries. 
Are country patterns with respect to growth becoming less defined? Arbache and Page 
(2008) found no obvious pattern when classifying countries according to long-term 
growth, geography, and geology, thus suggesting that initial conditions and other factors 
                                                 
13 These countries are Burundi, the Central African Republic, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Côte d'Ivoire, Eritrea, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, 
Togo, and Zimbabwe. 
14 Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. 
15 Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and the Republic of Congo. 
16 Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the 
Republic of Congo, Equatorial. Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, and São Tomé and Príncipe. 
17 SADC comprises Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. SADC is 
the largest regional group in table 1.2 (about 52 percent of Africa’s GDP). 
18 ECOWAS comprises Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. 
19 WAEMU comprises Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Senegal, 
and Togo. 
20 The Indian Ocean Commission comprises Comoros, Mauritius, Madagascar, and the Seychelles.   9
may play an important role in explaining performance. They found, however, that income 
typology—classification of countries above and below the median GDP per capita—to be 
suitable to predict human development indicators and economic performance when tested 
against others. In any case, the next section analyzes the recent growth record more 
rigorously over a longer period of time. 
 
 
III.  Growth Diagnostics - What Is Different Since 1995? 
 
How different is the recent experience in the context of Africa’s history of frequent 
growth accelerations and collapses? This section examines the issue on the basis of 
findings from a series of growth diagnostics and statistical tests conducted by Arbache 
and Page using long time-series and most recent purchasing power parity data for 45 
African countries. One of those studies (Arbache and Page 2007c) examine the 
characteristics and patterns of long-term growth in Sub-Saharan Africa for cross-country 
income structure, convergence, country level, growth persistence, and evidence for the 
formation of country groups or clubs. The growth diagnostics of this section are derived 
from the two other studies on growth cycles and their robustness (Arbache and Page 
2007a, 2007b), as well as various briefs by the Office of the Chief Economist of the 
World Bank’s Africa recion (AFRCE various years).  
 
 
A.  Africa’s growth 1975-2005 
 
The analysis uses GDP per capita (or per capita income hereafter) with regard to 
purchasing power parity (PPP) at 2000 international prices and its growth rate. Data on 
per capita income (PPP at 2000 international prices) and its growth rate are taken from 
the World Bank’s (various years) World Development Indicators (WDI), unless otherwise 
specified. The sample includes all Sub-Saharan countries except Liberia and Somalia, for 
which there are no data. Because the emphasis is on the representative country, 
unweighted country data in the aggregate analysis are used unless otherwise stated. The 
time-series spans 1975–2005.
21 Thus, there is an unbalanced panel of data with T = 31 
and N = 45. This period follows the first oil shock and includes the commodity prices 
plunge, when many African economies collapsed and several conflicts erupted; the 
introduction of structural reforms, which brought significant changes in many economies; 
and the recently observed growth recovery.  
 
Figure 4 shows that mean per capita income in Africa had a slow, positive long-
term trend, consisting of about 20 years of virtual stagnation with a point of inflexion 
upward in the mid-1990s. Since then, actual income has remained above the trend most 
of the time and the variance appears to have declined.
22 The same is true if growth rates 
of per capita income are used. Figure 5 shows Africa’s growth path over the same period. 
Trend growth declined until the late 1980s and increased thereafter, although there is 
                                                 
21 The WDI’s GDP per capita PPP series starts in 1975. 
22 The Hodrick-Prescott filter is used in figures 1.4 and 1.5 to smooth the estimate of the long-term trend 
component of the GDP series.   10
evidence of a slowdown in recent years. Variance has declined since the mid-1990s, and 




A trend break in 1995.  At the regional level, growth in per capita income 
increased substantially during 1995–2005 and was accompanied by a sharp reduction in 
the coefficient of variation. This story is consistent with that about aggregate GDP 
growth discussed earlier. The per capita growth rate rose from −0.23 percent of the 
previous decade to 1.88 percent during 1995–2005, and the absolute value of the 
coefficient of variation fell  from (-25.5) percent to 3.2 percent (table 1.3). This shift 
implies an increase of 2 percent in growth, which is about three times the long-term 
growth rate of 0.7 percent. Income per capita went up to $2,486 in 1995–2005, which 
represents an increase of about $300, or 11 percent, compared with previous periods. 
Recursive residual estimations, Chow breakpoint tests, and Chow forecast tests do not 
reject the hypothesis that a structural break in the growth series occurred between 1995 
and 1997 (Arbache and Page 2007b 
 
 
Table 3:  Per capita income, mean growth, and variation  for different periods in Africa 
Growth rate 




of variation  GDP per capita 
1975-2005 0.70  6.27  8.96  2,299 
1975-1984  0.13  6.92              53.23  2,180 
1985-1994          -0.23  5.87             -25.52  2,183 
1995-2005  1.88  5.99                3.19  2,486 
1975-1994          -0.07  6.33             -90.43  2,182 
(1995-2005) minus (1985-94)  2.11  0.12              28.71    303 
(1995-2005)minus (1975-94)  1.95               -0.34              93.61    304 
Source:  Arbache and Page (2007a) 
 
Figure 4:  Per capita income 
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Growth Trend Cycle
Source: Arbache and Page (2007a) 
Notes: Right axis = per capita income; left axis= cycle of p.c. income 
 
Source: Arbache and Page (2007a) 
Notes: Right axis = growth of p.c. income; left axis= cycle of 
growth rate   11
Hence, statistical evidence suggests that structural breaks occurred in the mid-
1990s for per capita income or its growth, thereby making it legitimate to break up the 
series before and after this period. To put the recent growth experience in better 
perspective, however, one must look at Africa’s long history of economic boom-bust 
cycles.  
   
 
B.  History of growths and collapses  
 
Although there has been a recent trend break, Africa’s growth over the past three decades 
has been both low and highly variable (Ndulu et al. 2007). Between 1975 and 2005, per 
capita income PPP grew by 0.7 percent per year, by far the lowest figure among 
developing regions. At the same time, country growth rates were highly volatile. 
Interestingly, however, there is no evidence that growth volatility was associated with 
Africa’s poor long-term economic performance (see Arbache and Page 2008c). This 
result is unexpected (Ramey and Ramey 1995; Hnatkovska and Loayza 2004 and may be 
misleading. Perhaps because no statistical association exists between Africa’s long-term 
growth rate and its volatility, most attempts to explain Africa’s growth performance have 
focused on investigating the determinants of growth over time and across countries using 
standard models and techniques (Collier and Gunning 1999; O’Connell and Ndulu 2000; 
Ndulu et al. 2007). Instead, given Africa’s high growth volatility, it may be more relevant 
and rewarding to examine the causes and consequences of medium-term deviations from 
the long-run trend: growth accelerations and decelerations.  
 
Identifying good times and bad.  As a means of investigating this phenomenon, 
the economic performance of African countries is classified into growth acceleration and 
deceleration on the basis of a variation of the methodology in Hausmann, Pritchett, and 
Rodrik (2005). What constitutes good times for a given country? There are four 
conditions: First, the four-year forward-moving average of GDP per capita growth minus 
the country’s four-year backward-moving average is greater than zero for a given year. 
Second, the four-year forward-moving average of growth is above the country’s long-run 
trend. Third, the four-year forward-moving average of GDP per capita exceeds the four-
year backward-moving average. Fourth, the first three conditions are satisfied for at least 
three years in a row, followed by the three subsequent years after the last year that 
satisfies the first three conditions. And what constitutes bad times?—the opposites of the 
first three conditions for good times. 
 
In contrast to Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik (2005), this methodology does not 
impose common parameters for identifying growth acceleration in a cross-section of 
countries. Instead, it identifies growth acceleration and deceleration by endogenizing 
each country’s economic conditions into the method, thus allowing for a much wider and 
more informative investigation of growth volatility. For example, a period with a modest 
average per capita growth rate of, say, 3 percent may not be substantial for many 
countries, but it may well be a genuine growth boom for a country enduring very low 
growth rates. This method takes care of this kind of issue, avoids unsupported 
generalizations, and provides more sensible results.   12
 
Using this methodology, one finds that African countries have experienced 
numerous episodes of growth acceleration in the past 30 years, but also a comparable 
number of growth collapses. In short, Africa’s long-run record of slow and volatile 
growth reflects a pattern of alternating, identifiable accelerations and declines, rather than 
random variations of growth rates around the long-run trend. In addition, growth 
volatility—when viewed as the product of accelerations and declines—is not neutral and 
indeed matters for economic and social outcomes. To begin to address the public policy 
questions posed by these results, one must look for correlates associated with acceleration 
and deceleration episodes and examine the probability that an economy will undergo a 
growth acceleration or deceleration.  
 
Growth acceleration and deceleration over time. Table 4 shows the 
unconditional probability of accelerations and decelerations and their respective growth 
rates for different periods. For the entire period from 1975 to 2005, there is a slightly 
higher probability of growth acceleration than deceleration: 25 percent of the 1,243 
country-year observations (total of valid observations per country per year) refer to 





Table 4:  Likelihood and growth rates of  economic acceleration and deceleration in Africa,  1975-2005 
All cty years            
in the period 
Cty years with  
growth acceleration 






















Frequency   
(of  cty-
years) 
1995-2005  (after trend break)  494  1.88  0.42  3.76  0.12  -1.29  0.46 
                       
1975-1994  (before trend break)  749  -0.07  0.14  3.39  0.29  -3.14  0.57 
    1985-1994  433  -0.23  0.21  3.21  0.36  -3.18  0.43 
    1975-1984  316  0.13  0.04  4.61  0.18  -3.06  0.78 
                       
1975-2005  (All  years)  1,243  0.7  0.25  3.64 0.22 -2.74 0.53 
 Source:  Arbache and Page (2007a)    
 
 
Between 1975 and 2005, countries in Africa that experienced growth 
accelerations managed to grow on average by 3.6 percent during those episodes, 
compared with the regionwide average of 0.7 percent. During decelerations, countries 
contracted on average by −2.7 percent. Given the almost equal probabilities of growth 
                                                 
23 As a means of checking the robustness of the results, growth accelerations and decelerations were also 
identified by replacing 0 with +1 percent and −1 percent for acceleration and deceleration, respectively, in 
condition 1, but the results did not change substantially. Therefore, only the base-case results are reported, 
because they are less restrictive   13
accelerations and decelerations, most of the benefits of growth accelerations on Africa  
were offset by growth collapses, leading to an overall tepid rate of growth. Had Africa 
avoided its growth collapses, it would have grown at 1.7 percent a year in per capita 
terms instead of 0.7 percent. Figure 6 shows the actual and simulated GDP per capita at 
these growth rates. Income per capita would have been at least 30 percent higher in 2005 
had bad times been avoided.
24 This finding is consistent with Easterly (1998), who 
argued that the incremental capital-output ratio, ICOR (or its inverse, the marginal returns 
of investment) of African countries such as Zambia fluctuated too much, so that growth 
opportunities were missed. Growth decelerations matter a great deal in the fight against 
poverty in Africa. 
 





















Source: Arbache and Page (2007b)
Actual GDP per capita
GDP per capita growth at the
observed average (0.7
percent a year)





The relative frequency of good and bad times over the past three decades follows 
Africa’s long-run pattern of growth. Accelerations were more frequent in 1995–2005; 
decelerations were more common in the two preceding decades. Forty two percent of the 
494 country-year observations for 1995–2005 occurred in countries experiencing growth 
accelerations, and only 12 percent in countries undergoing growth decelerations. The 
remaining 46 percent of observations belong to years in which countries were 
experiencing neither growth acceleration nor deceleration. In 1975–1984, growth 
decelerations were 350 percent more frequent than accelerations.
25
 PT In 1985–1994, this 
ratio had dropped to 71 percent, mainly because of a sharp rise in accelerations to 21 
percent from 4 percent. 
 
In 1995–2005, the average growth rate for countries during acceleration episodes 
was 3.8 percent, the second-highest average among the three 10-year periods. 
                                                 
24 The simulated growth rate without collapses takes into account the growth rate during all country-years 
but growth deceleration years. The additional GDP per capita results from the difference in compound 
growth at 1.7 percent and 0.7 percent in 1975–2005. 
25 Calculated as ((0.18/0.04) − 1)*100.   14
Interestingly, it was in 1975–1984, a period of very modest regional economic growth, 
that average growth during accelerations reached its highest rate. This finding reflects a 
compositional effect at work. In the past decade, even long-stagnant economies, such as 
the Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Mali, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania, 
experienced some sustained growth, pushing down the averages during acceleration 
episodes, whereas in 1975–1984, the high average growth rate was mainly due to a few 
growth accelerations overall and very rapid growth in the Republic of Congo. 
 
The average (negative) growth rate for countries experiencing growth 
decelerations in 1995–2005 was less than half that in previous decades, contributing to 
the more positive overall economic performance of the period. Economic declines had 
both the highest frequency—double that of the next highest decade—and the greatest 
impact on countries during the 1985–1995 period. 
 
Nonetheless, some caution arises from the fact that a significant amount of time—
53 percent—pertains to country-years with neither growth acceleration nor growth 
deceleration for the entire period from 1975 to 2005. These are supposed to be “normal 
times,” when countries were growing at the trend line. For much of the time before 1995, 
however (as shown in figure 4), that trend is very flat, the growth stagnant. From a very 
high 78 percent during 1975–84, that likelihood also fell to about 43 percent during 
1975–94. Since 1995, the probability of growing at the trend is still high at 46 percent, 
but the trend has shifted up to 1.9 percent a year. 
 
Country pattern of growth cycles.  Over the entire 30-year period, richer 
countries have had more growth accelerations, and poorer countries have experienced 
more growth collapses. This result is, of course, to some extent endogenous; average 
income per capita will tend to rise in countries with more frequent growth accelerations 
and fall in countries with more frequent collapses. But this result also holds in each 10-
year period, where the compounding effects may be assumed to be less important. It may 
indicate that richer countries can better take advantage of propitious circumstances and 
that poorer countries are less able to avoid bad times. There is one interesting exception. 
Income per capita for countries experiencing growth accelerations in 1995–2005 is 
slightly below the average for the region overall, thus indicating that growth successes 
have been spreading to poorer countries in the past decade. 
 
Table 5 shows the frequency of growth acceleration and deceleration episodes by 
country category and compares them with the mean. In general, there is no substantial 
difference in the probabilities of growth acceleration and deceleration episodes for a 
given country category. Although geography does not appear to matter, geology and 
conflict do.
26 As might be expected, oil exporters and resource-rich countries have more 
frequent growth accelerations but, somewhat unexpectedly, the same frequency of growth 
decelerations as the regional average. Conflict is also important in determining good 
times and bad. Major conflict countries had fewer growth accelerations than the regional 
average but also fewer decelerations. They also had significantly lower average growth 
than the regional average. Taken together, these results suggest that major conflict 
                                                 
26 See country assignment in table A.2 in Arbache and Page (2007b).   15
countries were trapped in a low-level equilibrium. Minor conflict countries have a 
substantially higher probability of a growth deceleration than the average and are much 
more likely to experience bad times than good times.  
 
      
Table 5: Frequency of growth acceleration and deceleration by country category 











All countries' mean  0.25  -  0.22  - 
Coastal  0.26 Above 0.22 Equal 
Landlocked 0.23  Below  0.22  Equal 
Coastal without resources  0.24  Below  0.23  Above 
Landlocked without 
resources  0.22 Below 0.22 Equal 
Oil  exporters  0.29 Above 0.23 Above 
Non-oil exporters  0.24  Below  0.22  Equal 
Resource  countries  0.30 Above 0.21 Below 
Non-resource countries  0.23  Below  0.23  Above 
Major  conflict  0.16 Below 0.17 Below 
Minor conflict  0.19  Below  0.32  Above 
Source: Arbache and Page (2007b). 
 
 
Table 6 shows the unconditional probabilities of growth acceleration and 
deceleration at the country level and the growth rates during these episodes. The gaps 
between growth rates during accelerations and decelerations at the country level tend to 
be high, generating the high growth volatility observed in Africa. The high average 
growth rates observed in many economies during acceleration episodes also show the 
resilience and capacity of the region’s economies to grow when economic and political 
conditions favor growth. The magnitude of economic contractions during deceleration 
episodes similarly indicates the severity of the consequences when economic and 
political conditions are unfavorable. 
 
Sixteen countries in our sample have avoided growth decelerations altogether. 
Many—Botswana, Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
and Uganda—are among the region’s top performers in per capita income growth over 
the three decades, but not all. Burkina Faso, Guinea, Namibia, São Tomé and Príncipe, 
and Swaziland are not among the region’s growth leaders. Avoiding growth collapses is 
important for long-run success at the country level, but it is not the only factor 
contributing to robust long-term growth. 
 
Seven countries—the Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Gabon, The 
Gambia, Madagascar, Mauritania, and Niger—have never had a growth acceleration. Of 
those seven, only Eritrea shows good long-term per capita income growth. Four of the 
seven had long-run declines in per capita income. 
   16



















Angola 0.48  0.28  0.70  3.93  -5.48 
Benin 0.27  0.23  0.59  1.60  -0.99 
Botswana 0.43  0.00  6.24  6.87     
Burkina Faso  0.43  0.00  1.21  1.39    
Burundi 0.20  0.23  -0.47  1.48  -4.45 
Cameroon 0.23  0.23  0.81  2.21  -5.34 
Cape Verde  0.42  0.00  3.26  3.57    
Central African Republic  0.23  0.53  -1.27  0.89  -1.95 
Chad 0.20  0.20  1.34  7.66  -1.66 
Comoros 0.24  0.28  -0.14  0.11  -1.89 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  0.00  0.30  -3.94     -7.60 
Congo, Rep.  0.20  0.43  0.61  10.05  -2.25 
Cote d'Ivoire  0.20  0.63  -1.57  1.82  -3.81 
Equatorial Guinea  0.42  0.00  10.55  20.88    
Eritrea  0.00  0.00  1.96       
Ethiopia 0.25  0.25  0.42  3.71  -3.05 
Gabon 0.00  0.40  -0.91      -1.52 
Gambia, The  0.00  0.23  0.29     -0.99 
Ghana 0.43  0.20  0.60  2.15  -4.33 
Guinea 0.37  0.00  0.98  1.78     
Guinea-Bissau 0.23  0.20  -0.70  0.76  -1.87 
Kenya 0.20  0.40  0.48  1.76  -0.75 
Lesotho 0.23  0.00  3.27  3.83     
Madagascar 0.00  0.43  -1.38      -2.12 
Malawi 0.23  0.37  0.22  1.68  -2.12 
Mali 0.33  0.23  0.86  2.75  -3.09 
Mauritania  0.00  0.00  0.10       
Mauritius 0.28  0.00 4.22 5.65     
Mozambique 0.32  0.00  2.08  5.08     
Namibia 0.32  0.00  0.15  2.14     
Niger 0.00  0.43  -1.01      -3.55 
Nigeria 0.53  0.20  0.27  1.99  -4.79 
Rwanda  0.20 0.20  1.68  2.27 2.12 
Sao Tome and Principe  0.47  0.00  0.31  0.99    
Senegal 0.27  0.23  0.36  1.75  -1.38 
Seychelles 0.53  0.00  2.46  4.01     
Sierra Leone  0.20  0.47  -0.57  7.95  -2.92 
South Africa  0.23  0.40  0.12  1.96  -1.72 
Sudan 0.30  0.00  1.72  3.90     
Swaziland 0.27  0.00  1.15  4.63     
Tanzania 0.47  0.00  1.69  3.69     
Togo 0.20  0.60  -0.60  4.27  -2.61 
Uganda 0.30  0.00  1.92  3.69     
Zambia 0.23  0.50  -1.23  2.35  -2.38 
Zimbabwe 0.20  0.27  -1.26  2.61  -5.34 
Note: blank space means country did not experience growth acceleration and/or deceleration. 
Source: Arbache and Page (2007b). 
 
 
C.  Does growth accelerations and deceleration matter?  
 
Although growth accelerations and decelerations are important features of Africa’s low 
and volatile long-run growth, do they matter for economic and social outcomes beyond 
their direct consequences on the rate of growth? If growth accelerations and decelerations 
have effects that are not neutral, one would expect economic, social, and governance   17
indicators during such episodes to be different than such indicators during normal times. 
We investigate the non-neutrality of growth volatility by examining differences in mean 
values in countries experiencing growth acceleration and deceleration episodes and 
simple correlations between changes in key economic and social variables and the 
presence or absence of growth accelerations and decelerations. Table 7 shows simple 
sample averages during growth accelerations, decelerations, and “normal” times (defined 
as the absence of either). It also gives the correlation coefficients between a number of 
economic, social governance, and institutional characteristics and the frequency of 
acceleration and deceleration episodes. 
 
What appears to increase the odds for good times?—in general, higher savings 
and investment, more foreign direct investment (FDI), and a more competitive exchange 
rate. What appears to increase the odds for bad times?—bad macroeconomic policy (high 
inflation), political instability, and bad governance. The specific results in table 7 also 
reveal an asymmetric relationship between growth accelerations and decelerations and 
some economic indicators.  
 
Savings, investment and consumption. The major changes in national accounts 
during growth episodes take place in investments and savings rather than in consumption. 
Savings and investments are higher during accelerations, compared with normal times, 
and substantially lower during deceleration episodes. FDI during accelerations is six 
times the figure for deceleration episodes. 
 
Correlations show that countries that have high savings and investment have a 
higher probability of growth acceleration and less probability of deceleration. 
Consumption is relatively lower during growth accelerations, which is consistent with the 
higher allocation of resources for investment. But consumption is also lower during 
decelerations, which is probably due to the fall in the purchasing power of households. 
 
Structure of the economy. The share of the agriculture sector is slightly higher in 
countries experiencing decelerations, whereas industry’s share is slightly larger in 
countries going through accelerations. Correlations suggest that countries that rely more 
on agriculture have more spells of growth deceleration, possibly because of a higher 
exposure to insects, droughts, and other natural disasters, but also because of swings in 
agriculture commodity prices. 
 
Macroeconomic management appears to be an important factor in both good 
times and bad times. Decelerations are accompanied by high inflation; one recent 
example is Zimbabwe. There is a positive correlation between inflation and the frequency 
of growth decelerations. Public debt is higher during both acceleration and deceleration 
episodes than it is during normal times, and government consumption falls during both 
accelerations and decelerations. Correlations suggest that countries that increased their 
debt also experienced more growth accelerations and decelerations, which may support 
the view that prudent debt management is important for reducing growth volatility. 
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The real effective exchange rate is more competitive during growth accelerations 
and highly appreciated during decelerations. Correlations suggest that exchange rate 
appreciation is associated with growth deceleration, whereas depreciation is associated 
with acceleration. There is no evidence that current accounts change during growth 
acceleration and deceleration. 
 
Trade is substantially lower during decelerations. Exports and especially imports 
drop sharply. Correlations indicate that countries that trade less are more exposed to 
growth decelerations. Somewhat surprisingly, the terms of trade are lower during growth 
accelerations. This result may indicate that although high commodity prices trigger 
growth, they may not be the main factor behind medium-term growth spells in Africa. 
 
Aid. Official development assistance (ODA) as a percentage of GDP is similar in 
both good and normal times but falls during growth decelerations. Per capita ODA, 
however, is higher during growth accelerations and lower during decelerations. The 
correlation analysis suggests that a higher share of ODA in GDP is associated with fewer 
growth collapses and that countries with higher ODA per capita experience more growth 
accelerations and have fewer collapses. These results indicate that ODA has been pro-
cyclical, reinforcing arguments for greater predictability of ODA to underpin sustained 
growth. 
 
Policies, institutions and governance.  Policies and institutions are also closely 
associated with both good and—especially—bad times. The World Bank’s Country 
Performance and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) score, a broad measure of policy and 
institutional performance, is lower during decelerations, but not significantly different 
between accelerations and normal times. The correlation coefficients suggest that 
countries with lower CPIA scores tend to experience more economic collapses. 
 
All the governance indicators—political stability, government effectiveness, rule 
of law, and control of corruption—are lower for growth decelerations than for the region 
as a whole.
27
 PT Correlation coefficients are negative, suggesting that a deterioration of 
governance is accompanied by more frequent growth decelerations. Voice and 
accountability scores are higher during growth accelerations. The correlations also 
suggest that countries that experience more growth accelerations have more voice and 
accountability and better regulatory quality. 
 
Minor conflicts are more frequent during growth deceleration episodes than 
during normal times. Major conflicts are less frequent during acceleration and 
deceleration episodes than for the region as a whole. The correlation coefficients suggest 
that minor conflicts are associated with collapses and that major conflicts hamper the 
chances of a growth acceleration. 
 
These results reinforce the findings of other empirical studies (Dufrénot, Sanon, 
and Diop 2006; Ndulu et al. 2007) of the close relationship between institutions and 
                                                 
27 Governance indicators are available for the following years: 1996, 1998, 2000, 2003, 2004, and 2005.   19
governance and economic performance in Africa. However, they also reveal that 
governance appears to be more relevant to understanding how to avoid a growth 
deceleration than how to promote an acceleration. 
 
Table 7: Means of economic, social governance, institutional characteristics during growth acceleration/decelerations 
and their correlations with the frequency of acceleration/deceleration episodes 





growth  Mean 
Correlation 
Coefficient Mean    
Correlation 
Coefficient 
Savings, Investment & Consumption                  
Savings  (% GDP)  11.4  15.3  *  .180  *  7.1  *  -.177  * 
Investments  (% GDP)  20.0  23.1  *  .176  *  15.5  *  -.236  * 
Private sector investment (% GDP)  12.2  13.8  *  .125  *  9.2  *  -.166  * 
Foreign direct investments net flow (% GDP)  2.51  4.20  *  .130  *  0.72  *  -.135  * 
Consumption (% GDP)  93.4  88.8  *  -.091  *  89.7  *  -.058  * 
                  
Macroeconomic Management                  
Consumer price index  (%)  27.2  15.2     -.034    184.7  *  .084  * 
GDP deflator (%)  26.9  16.7     -.028     175.0  *  .078  *  
Public debt  (% GNI)  87.3  112.3  *  .077  *   115.7  *   .089  * 
Government consumption  (% GDP)  17.2  16.0     -.038    15.2  *  -.084  * 
Real effective exchange rate  (2000=100)  130.2  115.1  *  -.107  *   186.4  *  .168  * 
Current account  (% GDP)  -5.96  -5.83     .056    --6.03     .011   
                  
Structure of the Economy                  
Agriculture value added  (%GDP)  29.8  28.6    -.050     31.9  *  .069  * 
Industry value added  (% GDP)  25.3  26.9    .061  *  24.6     -.042    
Service value added  (% GDP)  44.9  44.3     -.044     43.5     -.040    
                  
Trade                  
Trade  (% GDP)  74.7  76.2    .065   *  58.7  *  -.176  * 
Exports  (% GDP)  30.1  31.6    .056   *  26.5  *  -.083  * 
Imports  (% GDP)  44.6  44.4    .054    32.5  *  -.217  * 
Terms of trade  (2000=100)  109.5  102.2  *  -.102  *  114.5    .082  * 
                  
Aid                  
ODA  (% GDP)  14.2  13.8     .001     12.1    -.059  * 
ODA per capita  (US$)  57.3  69.5 *  .100 *  41.8 *  -.122  * 
                  
Policies, Institutions, and Governance                  
CPIA (scale 1=low to 6=high)  3.17  3.19     .065     2.75  *  -.206  * 
Voice and accountability (-2.5 to +2.5, low to high)  -0.65  -.45  *  .168 *  -1.08 *  -.209  * 
Political stability (-2.5 to +2.5)  -0.47  -.45     .051     -1.07  *  -.200  * 
Government effectiveness (-2.5 to +2.5)  -0.65  -.58     .100     -1.03  *  -.203  * 
Regulatory quality (-2.5 to +2.5)  -0.61 -.49    .129  * -.97  *  -.176  * 
Rule of law (-2.5 to +2.5)  -0.62  -.65     .037     -1.14  *  -.227  * 
Control of corruption (-2.5 to +2.5)  -0.55  -.57     .025     -0.92  *  -.182  * 
Minor conflict  (frequency)  0.09  .08     -.046     0.16  *  .082  * 
Major conflict  (frequency)  0.12  .05  *  -.070  *  0.07  *  -.044     20
                  
Human Development Outcomes                  
Life expectancy  (years)  50.8  51.3     .062     48.2  *  -.136  * 
Dependency ratio  0.93  .91    -.067  *  .93    .053    
Under 5 mortality (per 1,000)  150.4  145.8     -.108     188.7  *  .237  * 
Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births) 86.2  84.2      -.108     114.1  *  .277  * 
Primary completion rate (% of relevant age group)  53.2  52.7     .049     40.9  *  -.178  * 
Notes:   
(*) t-test significant at the 5% level. The means of variables are tested against the means of normal times corresponding to the respective periods 
of  growth acceleration or decelerations.  However, the sub-sample means of normal times are generally similar to those of the entire period in 
the second column.  See reference below for the details including the corresponding standard errors. 
Source:  Arbache and Page (2007b) 
                  
 
Human development outcomes. Growth variability also affects a number of 
important human development indicators. Life expectancy is substantially lower in 
countries experiencing growth decelerations than in countries experiencing normal times. 
The correlation coefficient is negative, suggesting that more collapses are associated with 
lower life expectancy. The dependency ratio is slightly lower during growth 
accelerations, and the correlation coefficient is negative, as expected. Mortality for 
children under age 5 and infant mortality are substantially higher during growth 
decelerations than in normal times, but these indicators do not improve during growth 
accelerations (see box 1). Correlation coefficients suggest that growth collapses are 
associated with increases in mortality. The primary completion rate is substantially lower 
in countries experiencing growth decelerations and is negatively correlated with growth 
collapses. 
 
Box 1: Asymmetric impacts of good and bad times on the poor: the case of infant 
mortality 
 
During normal times the average infant mortality rate across Sub-Saharan Africa is 86.2 
per 1,000. During good times, the ratio falls slightly to 84.2, which is not statistically 
different. But there is a major increase of infant mortality to 114.1 during the bad times. 
This evidence is illustrated by the kernel density distribution. During normal or 
accelerating times the kernel is right skewed (figures 6a and 6b). But during decelerating 
times the kernel curve is clearly skewed to the left, and a second peak emerges, 
representing the countries experiencing much worse infant mortality levels (figure 6c). 
 
Among the countries in the second peak are Malawi and Mali in 1980, both of whose 
infant mortality rate was 176.TPPT Remarkably, as growth accelerated these countries 
experienced substantially lower figures: 115 in 1995 for Malawi and 124 in 2000 for 
Mali. Other countries in the second peak include Angola in 1990 and 1995, Niger in 1985 
and 1990, and Sierra Leone in 1985, 1990, and 1995. These examples highlight the 
asymmetric relationship between growth acceleration and deceleration and social 
indicators, suggesting that growth volatility does matter and is marginally more important 
for the poor than growth acceleration.   21
 
Figure 6: Infant mortality (kernel density estimation) 
 
a) during normal times 
 
b) during growth 
acceleration 
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Source: World Bank Africa Development Indicators 2007. 
 
 
Explaining the probability of growth accelerations and decelerations.  Table 8 
shows the conditional probabilities of a country experiencing a growth acceleration and 
deceleration at the aggregate level. Models 1–4 refer to growth accelerations and models 
5–12 to growth decelerations. These regressions represent a further search for stylized 
facts about acceleration and deceleration episodes. No causality is inferred from the 
relationships, and no attempt has been made to control for endogeneity of some of the 
right-hand-side variables. 
 
Model 1 shows that a 1 percent change in investment is on average associated 
with a higher probability of a growth acceleration of about 0.1 percent. So, an increase of, 
say, 10 percent in investment is associated with an increase of 1 percent in the probability 
of a growth acceleration. Voice and resource endowment (models 2 and 3) are also 
positively associated with a growth acceleration. However, all coefficients are significant 
at only the 10 percent level, and the RP
2
P are low. Model 4 shows a regression with all these 
correlates together. Only voice and resource endowment remain significant at the 10 
percent level.  
 
All estimated coefficients of models 5–11 have the expected sign and are 
significant at the 5 percent level. They show that more investment, higher ODA per 
capita, increased imports, and better governance indicators are associated with fewer 
growth decelerations. Model 12 shows the coefficients for all the nongovernance 
indicators together. In this case, only investment remains significant. The governance 
indicators were not regressed together because of their very high collinearity. 
 
Only investment is significantly associated with the conditional probability of 
both acceleration and deceleration episodes. This finding suggests that investment is 
likely to be an important factor for predicting spells of growth and collapse at the   22
aggregate level, but one cannot assert with confidence that it is a leading indicator, 
because of its probable endogeneity. Better governance indicators reduce the likelihood 
of growth decelerations, but they are not closely associated with more frequent 
accelerations.  
 
Table 8: Conditional probability of growth acceleration and deceleration at the aggregate level 
Variable  Dependent variable: frequency of 




























(1.70)       
.047 
(.72)    
-.253     
(-3.23)                
-.233     
(-1.97) 
Voice (governance indicator)    
.056 
(1.87)    
.061 
(1.98)                         




(1.73)                         
Ln ODA per capita             
-.078     
(-2.17)                   
-.036     
(-.84) 
Ln imports                   
-.145     
(-2.40)             
.020 
(.21) 
Political stability (governance 
indicator)                      
-.068     
(-2.08)             
Government effectivenness 
(governance indicator)                         
-.127     
(-2.63)          
Rule of law (governance indicator)                            
-.115      
(-2.60)       
Control of corruption (governance 
indicator)                               
-.132      
(-2.68)    
R2  .06 .08 .06 .16 .10 .19 .12 .09 .14  .14  .15  .21 
N  45 44 45 44 45 45 45 44 44  44  44  44 
Note: t-test in parentheses. 
Source: Arbache and Page (2007b). 
                
 
Table 9 shows fixed-effect logistical models that predict the presence of a growth 
acceleration or deceleration at the country level. Increases in savings, foreign direct 
investment, and consumption increase the odds of a growth acceleration, whereas 
government consumption and major conflicts reduce the odds. In the deceleration 
regression, increases in savings, investment, FDI, and trade reduce the odds of a growth 
deceleration, whereas inflation and minor conflicts increase the odds of collapse.
28 PT Only 
savings, FDI, and conflict appear in both regressions. These results suggest that policies 
aimed at attaining sustained growth and preventing growth collapses need to focus on 
ways to increase savings, attract foreign investments, and reduce conflicts. 
 
                                                 
28 Random-effect models, including dummies for oil-producing countries, and landlocked and resource-rich 
countries returned statistically insignificant results. Hausmann tests suggest that fixed-effect estimates are 
preferable to random effect.   23
Table 9: Predicting growth acceleration and deceleration - panel data 
Dep. variable: dummy of 
growth acceleration 
Dep. variable: dummy of 
growth deceleration  Variable 
Odds  ratio p-value Odds  ratio p-value 
Savings 1.152  .000  .929  .000 
Investment in fixed capital        .956  .062 
Foreign direct investments net flow  1.146  .000  .811  .000 
GDP deflator        1.010  .016 
Consumption  1.051  .004       
Government consumption  .904  .000       
Trade        .980  .008 
Minor conflict        1.744  .045 
Major conflict  .435  .064       
LR (chi2)  127.6  .000  97.4  .000 
N  825     647    
Note: fixed effect logit regression. 
Source: Arbache and Page (2007b) 
        
 
 
D.  Good luck or good policy - How robust is the recent growth? 
 
Today’s Africa is clearly different from the Africa of the early 1990s, when it was 
coming out of the declines after the first two oil price shocks, the debt problems, and 
stagnation of the adjustment years. Thanks to the recent acceleration of growth, there is 
definitely a higher economic base to work with. But how sustainable is that growth? Are 
the main contributing factors good luck or good policy? As the growth diagnostics so far 
indicate, the answer hinges not only on policy and governance but also on economic 
fundamentals, such as factor accumulation and productivity as well as trade and export 
diversification—and the significance of the changes in these fundamentals. This section 
evaluates Africa’s recent growth against the lessons learned in the previous sections. 
 
Commodity prices and terms-of-trade. External circumstances have certainly 
been favorable since the mid-1990s: the global economy has been expanding at 3.2 
percent a year, global trade expanded by 40 percent a year, and the share of FDI in the 
world GDP nearly doubled from 1.15 percent in 1995 to more than 2.23 percent in 2005. 
As a result of greater demand, commodity prices, including oil prices, have been pushed 
to new high levels. Hence, the better economic performance in the recent period is 
certainly partly due to the higher export prices of many African countries (figure 7). 
Higher oil prices now benefit about 8–10 oil-exporting countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
as discussed in the previous section. Non-oil commodity prices have also risen 
significantly. Of the 40 commodity prices monitored regularly, only cotton prices 
declined from the high prices of the 2003 drought year. Hence, gains from higher export 
prices for commodities such as gold, aluminum, copper, and nickel more than offset the 
losses from higher oil import bills in several oil-importing countries, such as Burundi, 
Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Overall, 























of trade for Sub-Saharan African countries have fared much more favorably in the current 
oil price cycle, relative to their respective starting points (figure 8).
29 
 
   
 
Figure 7: Commodity and oil prices    
(Price indices, 2000=100) 
 
Figure 8: Terms of Trade Index in SSA 
1973-1980 and 1999-2006 















Source: World Bank various years b.  Source: AFRCE various years; World Bank various years. 
 
Figure 9: Nominal and Real Price of Oil in SSA 
(Price indices, 2000=100) 
 
Figure 10:  Official Development Assistance to SSA 
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Source: World Bank various years b.  Source: OECD DAC various years; World Bank various years h. 
 
 
For oil-importing countries, the weakening of the U.S. dollar has also meant that 
the oil price in euros or local currency has not risen as much. For Sub-Saharan Africa in 
                                                 
29 The recovery of terms of trade in non-oil-exporting developing countries since the late 1990s is, 
however, still below the peaks of the early 1980s. Data are from the World Bank’s World Economic 
Indicators.   25
particular, the real price increases of oil were in fact significantly lower than the recent 
nominal price increases quoted in dollars, after adjusting for exchange rate movements 
and domestic inflation. Since 2000, the nominal price of oil has tripled, whereas the real 
price has doubled (see figure 9). Although the nominal price was approaching $100 a 
barrel toward the end of 2007, the real oil price for oil importers in Africa was only 2.6 
percent higher than in 2006.  
 
Nonetheless, although economic performance remains strong in many African 
countries (as seen in table 1), several non-resource-rich countries will have to be 
monitored because their terms-of-trade losses were exacerbated by unfavorable changes 
in both oil and import prices. These countries include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, 
Comoros, Eritrea, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius, Niger, 
Senegal, the Seychelles, and Togo. In most cases, the additional negative shock came 
from prices of staple imports, such as wheat, rice, and vegetable oils. Eritrea, for 
example, had an estimated negative terms-of-trade impact of greater than 5 percent of 
GDP from higher food prices, while Lesotho, Mauritania, Senegal, and Togo had an 
estimated negative terms-of-trade impact in excess of 2 percent of GDP because of 
changes in food prices.  
 
  Effects of external shocks on growth and poverty.  The importance of terms-of-
trade shocks in Sub-Saharan Africa has been evolving. Historical data suggest that 
external shocks are important determinants of growth in Africa (see, for example, Deaton 
and Miller 1995; Collier and Dehn 2001). Collier (2007) finds this is especially true in 
resource-rich countries. Moreover, Collier and Dehn (2001) observe that aid may 
mitigate the negative consequences of external shocks. However, Hausmann, Pritchett, 
and Rodrik (2005) argue that positive external shocks are strongly correlated only with 
short-term economic expansions, not with sustained growth episodes. Collier and Goderis 
(2007) confirmed that positive shocks have short-term effects on outputs, but negative 
shocks have lasting damaging effects. IMF (2007a) finds that most ongoing growth spells 
in Africa are taking place amid negative terms-of-trade shocks since the current growth 
began, suggesting that other factors have been more important in recent years. Looking at 
these issues carefully, Raddatz (2008) finds that the relative importance of external 
shocks as sources of output instability in African countries has actually increased in the 
past 15 years and that this increase is the result of two reinforcing factors: (1) a decline in 
the variance of internal shocks, including policy failures or conflicts, and (2) a relative 
increase in the vulnerability of output to external shocks, while output variability in 
general is declining among African countries. Contrary to the importance attributed to oil 
prices in policy circles, Raddatz also finds that they are not particularly important for 
output volatility in the typical African country, but only among those countries that are 
net oil exporters. Without compensating developments, such as higher export prices, 
exogenous flows, or adjustment policies, however, the marginal impact of an oil price 
shock can be quite significant, as shown in two case studies - Andriamihaja and Vecchi 
(2008) on Madagascar and Essama-Nssah, Go, Kearney, Korman, Robinson, and 
Thierfelder (2008) on South Africa.  
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Aid flows and debt relief.  Moreover, new commitments to scale up foreign aid 
from industrial countries have already led to greater external resources and debt relief for 
poor countries. Recent aid commitments and actual disbursements (inclusive of debt 
relief) have already recovered to the high points of the early 1990s (see figure 10). 
Moreover, additional and significant debt relief became a reality when the World Bank 
and IMF approved the financing and implementation of the Multilateral Debt Relief 
Initiative (MDRI) starting on July 1, 2006. Sixteen countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
together accounting for 23 percent of the regional income but 43 percent of the total 
population, have now reached the completion point for significant debt relief under the 
enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative and have qualified for further 
assistance from the MDRI. Benefiting from debt relief, MDRI countries did very well 
recently and grew by over 5.3 percent during 2000–06 (table 1).
30  
 
Nonetheless, the promises made at the Gleneagles summit to scale up aid have yet 
to materialize. In particular, aid still has to go much beyond the high points of the 1990s 
to double by 2010, as pledged by donors. Chuhan-Pole and Fitzpatrick (2008) reviews 
several issues relating to aid: its trends, its distribution with regard to debt relief and new 
flows, its reliability with regard to volatility and predictability, and its progress toward 
donor alignment and harmonization. The scaling up of aid also presents several 
challenges in the macroeconomic management of aid, and the paper by Go, Korman, 
Page, and Ye (2008) reviews the issues regarding the absorption and spending of aid, the 
efficiency and composition of additional public expenditure, and the evolution of the 
macroeconomic framework to integrate microeconomic aspects at the World Bank, as 
well as several case studies on fiscal space issues. Moreover, the paper by Devarajan, Go, 
Page, Robinson, and Thierfelder (2008) argues that the specter of Dutch disease from 
additional aid is intrinsically related to the predictability of aid: if aid is certain and 
sufficient to allow intertemporal substitution to take place in consumption and supply, the 
issue of real exchange appreciation ceases to be an issue. Moreover, the scaling-up debate 
is taking place amid rapid globalization and development of capacity, which changes 
results. 
 
Better leadership.  However, the current acceleration of growth is not all due to 
luck; better policy seems to be taking place in Sub-Saharan Africa. Africa today enjoys 
better economic prospects because its leaders have undertaken major reforms during the 
past 10 years and are taking increasing control of their economic destiny. African 
governments are making regional initiatives in conflict resolution and are taking action to 
improve governance under the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development initiatives. These initiatives are designed to 
 
•  Push African countries to be assertive about ownership and to assume leadership and 
accountability for their development programs. 
 
                                                 
30 So far, MDRI countries include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.   27
•  Improve the reputation of the region through certification of good practices in 
governance for a critical mass of African countries under the African Peer Review 
mechanism. 
 
•  Increase regional connectivity to improve capacity to trade within the region and with 
the outside world. 
 
•  Enhance the capacity of a rationalized system of regional bodies to provide regional 
public goods, such as cross-country transportation and power sharing, coordination in 
managing pandemics, and protection of regional commons such as the Nile and the 
Great Lakes.  
 
 
Overall Policy and Institutional Environment.  Although there is no perfect or 
leading indicator of the overall quality of policy and institutional environment, the World 
Bank’s CPIA provides a consistent framework for assessing country performance on 16 
items, which are grouped into four wide-ranging clusters: economic management, 
structural policies, policies for social inclusion and equity, and public sector management 
and institutions.  
 
The average CPIA scores for African countries have been rising. The average 
CPIA score in 1995 was 2.8. By 2006, it had risen to 3.2. The number of African 
countries with scores equal to or greater than the threshold of 3.5 for international good 
performance had also risen, from 5 countries in 1997 to 17 in 2006.  
  
Economic performance among African countries is highly correlated with the 
quality of policy (see figure 11). Countries with CPIA scores of greater than or equal to 
3.5 by 2006 tend to have higher growth and lower inflation than those with scores lower 
than 3.5 (excluding Zimbabwe). The low-income countries (excluding middle-income 
and oil-exporting countries) with good policy and institutional environment are in fact 
doing very well: growth averaged 5.1 percent and inflation was 6.9 percent.  
 
Macroeconomic Management.  The most striking improvement in policy is 
observed for macroeconomic stabilization. Inflation among African countries has come 
down dramatically since 1995 (figure 12). The number of countries able to keep inflation 
below 10 percent a year increased from 11–26 in the early 1990s to about 31–35 since 
2000. From the 1980s to the present, there were as many as 10 different African countries 
with hyperinflation (greater than 50 percent) at one point or another. The extreme values 
can run over thousands of percentage points. The countries with hyperinflation have 
included Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Mozambique, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Uganda, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe.  
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Figure 11: Economic Performance of African Countries 
by Quality of Policy, 2000-06 
 
Figure 12: Inflation Pattern of African Countries 
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Sources: AFRCE various years; World Bank various years g. 
 
In recent years, all these countries except Zimbabwe have been able to contain 
inflation drastically. The regional average has fallen below 10 percent since 2002.
31 This 
performance is all the more remarkable in view of the significant increase in oil prices 
that started in 1999.  
 
Another indicator of macroeconomic stabilization, the overall fiscal balance, also 
improved.
32 The average fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP in African countries 
declined from 5.7 percent during the 1980s and 1990s to 2.9 percent during 2000–06. 
Fiscal policy in oil-exporting countries has also improved. Unlike the unchecked wasteful 
spending in the past, windfalls from oil revenue are increasingly being saved. At the start 
of the current oil price shock, fiscal deficits were increasingly reduced, and by 2004–06, 
the overall fiscal surplus averaged about 8 percent for the group. More needs to be done, 
and two recent papers examine the issues relating to fiscal policy and rules: Devlin,  
Lewin, and Ranaweera. (2008) examine the fiscal management of oil revenue to improve 
its effect on growth, while Budina and van Wijnbergen (2008) look at the role of fiscal 
policy in managing oil revenue volatility in the case of Nigeria. 
Adjustment to Higher Oil Prices.  For the past seven to eight years, most oil-
importing countries in Africa have already been slowly adjusting to the new and higher 
trend of oil prices, and their ability to continue the adjustment will be the key to future 
growth, especially if higher oil prices persist. Since 2003, the majority of African 
countries have allowed frequent and full passthrough of higher oil prices to domestic 
                                                 
31 Excluding the hyperinflation in Angola and Zimbabwe . In Angola’s case, inflation fell over 300 percent 
in 2000 to about 13 percent in 2006. 
32 Low-income countries in Africa are generally constrained from borrowing in international capital 
markets. As a result, the current account balance, the other significant macrobalance, is not a policy-
dependent variable or a good indicator of macroeconomic management. Imports in these countries tend to 
adjust to export revenues and aid inflows.   29
prices. The passthrough is less pronounced in oil-exporting countries. A few countries, 
such as Côte d’Ivoire and Ethiopia, have at one point or another suspended the use of 
formulas in favor of less frequent and ad hoc adjustments. Many countries have also tried 
to protect the poor by limiting price increases and taxation of kerosene. For 14 African 
countries for which data are available, petroleum subsidies increased from 0.75 percent of 
GDP in 2003 to 1 percent in 2005. On average, petroleum taxes are important sources of 
revenue and constitute close to 2 percent of GDP in indirect taxes. 
 
In a recent Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (ESMAP) study
33 of 
31 developing countries,
 the amount of passthrough in gasoline and diesel was found to 
be positively correlated with a country’s terms of trade and inflation (GDP deflator) and 
negatively correlated with a country’s oil vulnerability, overall fiscal position, and per 
capita income or growth; interestingly, it is also negatively correlated with whether a 
country is an oil producer or exporter. The debt-to-GDP ratio affects gasoline pricing 
negatively but not diesel pricing. The 31 developing countries in the sample showed less 
passthrough of oil cost when compared with industrial countries, particularly with respect 
to diesel (table 1.10). However, the results for 11 African countries confirmed that 
African countries have not been delaying adjustment to their fuel prices, even when 
compared with developed countries; hence, the risks of an unsustained fiscal position 
appear to be less than in past episodes of oil price shocks. Overall, diesel prices tended to 
be protected from increases to protect the poor—although such increases are 
implemented relatively less often in African countries. Outside of a few instances in 
which market mechanisms were directly suspended, African governments have been 
actively intervening in the fuel markets in other ways to help the poor or consumers: by 
adjusting taxes and subsidies, regulating margins, mandating conservation measures and 




                                                 
33 See Bacon and Kojima (2006).  ESMAP is a global technical assistance partnership that has been 
administered by the World Bank and sponsored by bilateral official donors since 1983. 
34 See Bacon and Kojima (2006) for various case studies of African countries.   30
Table 10: Pass-Through Coefficients for Gasoline and Diesel 
In Local Currency 
Country Gasolina  Diesel 
Reference industrial countries (6)*  1.13  0.96 
Developing countries – (31)  1.03  0.88 
     Non-SSA countries (20)  0.92  0.73 
     SSA countries (11)   1.22  1.16 
          Cameroon  0.91  0.98 
          Ethiopia  0.48  0.64 
          Ghana  1.33  1.21 
          Kenya  0.97  0.79 
          Madagascar  1.46  1.55 
          Malawi  1.14  1.22 
          Mozambique  1.10  1.01 
          Rwanda  0.98  0.76 
          Tanzania  1.57  1.52 
          Uganda  1.23  1.14 
          Zambia  2.20  1.93 
*Figures in parentheses are number of countries. 
Source:  Bacon and Kojima (2006).  
 
 
Exchange rate regimes.  Unlike the past, countries with flexible exchange 
regimes now account for about 76 percent of Africa’s GDP and 68 percent of the region’s 
population. In recent years, and during the current oil price shock, these countries have 
also tended to grow better than the regional average and better than countries with fixed 
exchange rates (table 2).   In franc zone countries, a strong currency tied to the euro is 
bringing about concerns regarding real exchange rate appreciation and its impact on 
export competitiveness (box 2). 
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Box 2: Real Exchange Rate in franc zone. Countries with fixed exchange rate regimes are 
mostly in the franc zone, where the CFA franc is tied to the euro.  There is however an increasing 
divergence between the eastern and western part of the zone.  The CEMAC countries benefit 
from large oil inflows and their growth performance is better in the 1990s and since 2000. The 
WAEMU countries did not adjust as well to higher oil prices, partly because their exports were 
hurt by an exchange rate tied to a strong euro. The growth of the latter decelerated to 2.7 percent 
since 2000 with some improvement during 2004-06 at 3.5 percent a year.  Real exchange rate 
changes for selected countries indicate appreciations during 2000-06 of: 17 percent in Benin, 9 
percent in Burkina Faso, 18 percent in Chad, 13 percent in Côte d’Ivoire, 8 percent in Togo and 1 
percent in Mali.  The country level appreciations (with the exception of Mali) are sufficiently 
large to be worrisome from the point of view of export competitiveness, although whether an 
adjustment of the CFA franc is necessary depends (among other things) on whether the strength 
of the euro relative to the dollar will persist. 
 
The Case of Cotton.  The structure of CFA zone economies is such that an appreciation of the 
exchange rate will reduce the real price of exports much more rapidly than the unit cost of labor 
with negative consequences for export competitiveness; but the impact will vary considerably at 
the sector level in each country. The case in point is the cotton sector.  Because cotton prices are 
quoted in US dollars, cotton producers in the CFA franc zone are increasingly confronted with 
export prices that are significantly lower in euro/CFA franc than the price in dollars (see Figure 
14).  This disparity puts downward pressure on farm gate prices and will add to the potential 
fiscal cost of any scheme to stabilize farm prices or provide financial assistance to poor farmers.  
In the case of the cotton sector, the issue goes beyond the exchange rate, however, and reflects 
declining relative cotton prices driven by new technologies employed by new competitors such as 
Brazil, China and India. 
 
 
Figure 13:  Real Effective Exchange Rate 
in Franc Zone Countries 
 
Figure 14: Monthly Price of Cotton (AINDEX) in US 




















































































































































































Source:  AFRCE various years. 
 
   32
Reduction of policy mistakes across countries.  Hence, though external 
circumstances have been favorable, there is also strong evidence that African countries 
have increasingly learned to avert economic mistakes and have avoided bad leadership, 
conflict, corruption, and macroeconomic instability. Such reduction of policy mistakes is 
central to preventing growth collapses—a key point from the growth analysis described 
earlier.  
 
To look at how widespread the phenomenon is, table 11 compares the 
unconditional probabilities of growth acceleration and deceleration by country groups 
during 1995–2005 against the averages for the entire sample, 1975–2005. The likelihood 
of growth decelerations has clearly declined by half across the board for different types of 
countries to about 12–14 percent, which is the average for Africa during 1995–2005. In 
addition, the probability of major conflict has declined the most: from 17 to 6 percent. 
Likewise, the likelihood of growth acceleration has improved for different types of 
countries. That said, oil exporters and resource-rich countries have experienced more 
growth accelerations than all other country subsets—well above the mean for the entire 
period or all countries during same recent period. This finding suggests that better 
commodity prices and terms of trade were still significant factors; for the recent period at 
least, possessing mineral resources has not been a curse to growth. 
 
 
Table 11: Frequency  (country-years) of growth acceleration and deceleration,  
by country category, 1995-2005 versus 1975–2005 










All  countries'  mean  0.25 0.42 0.22 0.12 
Coastal  0.26 0.44 0.22 0.12 
Landlocked  0.23 0.34 0.22 0.14 
Coastal  without  resources  0.24 0.38 0.23 0.14 
Landlocked  without  resources  0.22 0.34 0.22 0.14 
Oil  exporters  0.29 0.49 0.23 0.12 
Non-oil  exporters  0.24 0.40 0.22 0.12 
Resource  countries  0.30 0.55 0.21 0.08 
Non-resource  countries  0.23 0.36 0.23 0.14 
Major  conflict  0.16 0.35 0.17 0.06 
Minor  conflict  0.19 0.32 0.32 0.13 
Source: Arbache and Page (2007a) 
 
 
Economic fundamentals before and after 1995. If growth is robust, economic 
fundamentals should have become stronger in the past decade. Table 1.12 compares 
sample means of economic fundamentals during 1995–2005 for all countries and all 
episodes (growth acceleration, growth collapses, and normal times), as well as for the 
subset of countries undergoing growth accelerations with sample means of the same   33




Table 12: Differences of Means of Key Economic Variables Before and After 1995 




















I.  During All Episodes                         
Savings  (% GDP)  12.05  10.47  *  10.88  10.8     14.85  9.68  * 
Investments  (% GDP)  20.26  19.4     18.93  18.78     23.4  20.92  ** 
Private sector investment (% GDP)  12.51  11.46  **  11.23  10.6     15.43  13.47    
Foreign direct investments net flow (%  GDP)  4.95  1.50  * 3.63  1.41  * 8.23  1.75  * 
Consumption (% GDP)  91.12  92.09     95.85  95.24     79.9  84.15  * 
Trade    (%  GDP)  76.58  68.43  * 72.73  66.11  * 85.77 74.1  * 
Exports  (% GDP)  32.27  28.06  *  28.86  25.67  *  40.32  33.92  * 
Imports  (% GDP)  44.27  40.36  *  43.86  40.44  *  45.25  40.18  * 
Real effective exchange rate  (2000=100)  103.52  182.78  * 100.06  186.64  * 109.18  174.71  * 
Terms of trade  (2000=100)  102.4  113.7  *  101.63  110.01  *  104.53  123.17  * 
Current account  (% GDP)  -5.58  -6.17     -6.43  -6.5     -3.71  -5.53    
Consumer price index  (%)  33.98  71.8     16.98  81.52     77.81  41.91    
GDP deflator (%)  45.85  65.48     30.46  76.85     71.77  37.28    
Public debt  (present value, % GNI)  128.41  85  *  114.53  77.38  *  163.61  104.23  * 
Government consumption  (% GDP)  15.48  17.24  * 15.12  16.55  * 16.44  18.91  * 
                  
II.  During Growth Acceleration                         
Savings  (% GDP)  12.9  20.94  *  12.13  20.27  *  14.1  22.83  * 
Investments  (% GDP)  21.55  25.47  *  19.39  25.12  *  24.9  26.39    
Private sector investment (% GDP)  13.51  14.15     11.6  13.46  *  16.45  16.23    
Foreign direct investments net flow (% GDP)  5.02  2.4  *  2.35  2.08     9.44  3.24    
Consumption (% GDP)  88.78  88.23     91.89  94.93     83.97  70.92  * 
Trade  (% GDP)  70.27  86.1  *  60.76  86.21  *  85.22  85.81    
Exports  (% GDP)  29.47  35.8  *  24.48  32.49  *  37.21  44.36    
Imports  (% GDP)  40.71  50.3  *  36.27  53.71  *  47.69  41.58    
Real effective exchange rate  (2000=100)  108.96  128.77  * 109.54  125.87  * 108.35  136.18  ** 
Terms of trade  (2000=100)  104.38  99.06  **  105.51  100.72     102.08  94.14    
Current account  (% GDP)  -6.5  -4.46     -6.61  -6.7     -6.33  1.16  ** 
Consumer price index  (%)  14.16  17.06     9.14  16.76  *  23.28  18.45    
GDP deflator (%)  15.54  18.73     9.21  19.12  *  25.1  17.71    
Public debt  (present value, % GNI)  120.91  94.52  **  89.75  94.98     172.42  93.14  * 
Government consumption  (% GDP)  15  17.7  *  13.3 16.74  *  17.85 20.16     
Notes:                     
 (*) t-test that means are not equal significant at the 5% level.                 
 (**) t-tes that means are not equal significant at the 10% level.                 




                                                 
35 So that the subsets’ sample sizes are consistent, oil-exporting countries are not accessed separately.   34
Progress among all African countries was observed in the means of several 
economic fundamentals for all economic episodes, but the record was not uniform. 
Savings were higher than in the previous decade, as indicated by the t-test. Although 
aggregate investments did not change significantly, private investment and FDI went up. 
In particular, FDI increased by threefold in the period 1995–2005, to 5 percent from 1.5 
percent in the previous decade. Nonetheless, neither the magnitudes of savings and 
investments as a percentage of GDP nor their changes were large, relative to levels in 
other successful sustained-growth economies (such as those in South and East Asia). 
 
Trade as a share of GDP increased significantly (by about 8 percent) with exports 
and imports increasing by 4 percent each. The small change in the current account 
balance was not statistically significant, remaining close to about 6 percent. The real 
exchange rate appreciated substantially to an index of 103.5 from 138.0 in 1985–94, most 
likely as a result of favorable commodity prices since 2000. This trend raises concerns 
that the export competitiveness of nonprimary exports will continue to be an issue. On 
average, the terms of trade became slightly less favorable in the more recent decade, also 
reflecting the offsetting patterns before and after 2000. Average inflation was cut by half, 
but the change was not statistically significant because of large variations in the 
consumer price indexes of individual countries. The present value of public debt 
increased significantly, but it is likely that these data do not reflect fully the debt relief in 
more recent years. Government consumption decreased by about 2 percent of GDP to 
15.5 percent from 17.2 percent, while no significant difference was observed for private 
consumption. 
 
Table 12 also presents the results for non-resource-rich and resource-rich 
countries. For non-resource-rich countries, improvements were also observed for FDI, 
trade, exports, and imports in the full sample, but they were slightly more muted when 
compared with the results for all countries. The means for the real exchange rate, terms of 
trade, public debt, and government were significantly different in the two decades and 
more or less followed the same pattern as for all countries. In contrast, the means for 
savings and private investments in non-resource-rich countries were not significantly 
different in the two periods. The reduction in inflation remains insignificant because of 
great variation. 
 
The results are somewhat more favorable for the resource-rich countries. Savings 
and aggregate investments in resource-rich countries experienced substantial increases 
(by about 5 percent of GDP) in 1995–2005. FDI showed an impressive jump to 8.2 
percent of GDP from 1.8 percent, confirming that most FDI flows to Africa are 
concentrated in the mineral sectors. No significant change was observed for private 
investment. Mineral wealth did not lead to a higher level of private and public 
consumption, suggesting that windfall revenue was increasingly saved. However, public 
debt still increased. Trade, particularly exports, increased more than imports, but not 
enough to turn the current accounts into surplus. The real exchange rate appreciated, as 
expected, but as for other countries, the terms of trade became less favorable. Inflation 
did not improve, and the level was high on average for 1995–2005. 
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Important compositional effects were at work, affecting the differences of means 
for the subset of countries experiencing growth accelerations. Savings for all African 
countries undergoing growth accelerations, for instance, fell significantly, from 21 
percent in 1985–94 to 13 percent in 1995–2005. Two factors were at work. Because the 
probability of a growth acceleration was higher during 1995–2005, the number of 
observations was larger (for example, 201 country-years for savings), pulling in a wider 
variety of country circumstances, including economies with low savings rates. In 
contrast, the probability of a growth acceleration was much lower for 1985–94, and the 
number of observations was therefore few (for example, 84 country-years for savings). 
However, the countries that did grow during this more difficult period had substantially 
better economic indicators than those experiencing normal or bad times. In addition to 
savings, compositional effects for all countries were also observed in aggregate 
investment, trade, exports, imports, and terms of trade. This factor was less important for 
FDI, the real exchange rate, public consumption, and public debt. 
 
In general, there were more significant compositional effects for non-resource-
rich countries than for resource-rich countries during growth accelerations. The effect 
was common only for savings. In non-resource-rich countries, these compositional effects 
were also observed for aggregate investment, private sector investment, trade, exports, 
and imports. One area in which the non-resource-rich countries did much better during 
growth accelerations was inflation: not only was the level much lower in the second 
period, but also the means in the two periods were significantly different. 
 
Overall, there is therefore modest evidence of improvements in economic 
fundamentals, in particular for resource-rich countries. The data are, however, somewhat 
mixed, and the robustness of Africa’s growth remains fragile. 
 
 



















Per capita GDP growth  1.34  6.75  1.13  2.23  4.27  3.89 
Savings  (% GDP)  17.47  38.45  21.04  23.85  22.39  26.01 
Investments  (% GDP)  17.69  32.77  19.17  22.49  22.88  23.65 
Private sector investment (% GDP)  13.11  19.27  16.39  13.92  16.36  16.83 
FDI net flow (% GDP)  2.60  3.22  3.24  1.16  0.79  2.73 
Consumption  (%  GDP)  84.10 68.03 80.85  75.64  80.54  76.23 
Trade  (% GDP)  62.31  66.85  42.72  57.38  31.90  55.43 
Exports  (% GDP)  30.62  35.04  21.47  28.15  14.81  27.95 
Imports  (% GDP)  31.68  31.78  21.25  29.22  17.09  27.47 
Terms of trade  (2000=100)  101.89  90.89  101.50  NA  104.10  96.28 
GDP deflator (%)  7.16  4.91  6.17  5.20  5.67  6.48 
Government consumption  (% GDP)  16.00  13.47  14.52  15.04  10.83  14.34 
Note: the sample averages refer to all years between 1995 and 2005. 
Source: Arbache and Page (2007a) 
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Africa relative to other regions. Table 13 puts Sub-Saharan Africa in perspective 
and compares key economic indicators with those of other developing regions in 1995–
2005. Inflation was single digit and only slightly below that of other regions. On 
aggregate, FDI and trade compare well with such indicators in other regions (there are 
issues, however, as discussed next). The growth rate was still behind that of the low- and 
middle-income countries but comparable to that of Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Savings and investments were still well below those of other regions. Both private 
consumption and government consumption were higher than those of other regions, 




Figure 15: Non-Oil Exports as Percent of GDP 
(SSA versus other regions) 
 
























Note: Export shares are unweighted averages.
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Figure 17: Concentration and Diversification of 
Export: 2000-2004 Average (SSA versus other regions) 
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Trade and FDI.  Trade reforms have brought down tariffs in Africa, and the trade 
regimes do not discriminate against exports relative to other regions worldwide. 
However, African exports, particularly non-oil exports, are growing slowly (figure 15). In 
fact, in sharp contrast to the case for China and for Asia’s top performing countries, 
exports are not growing in importance in the region’s output and are declining in 
importance for Africa’s top performers. As a result, Africa’s share of world trade is 
falling (figure 16). And Africa’s exports remain heavily concentrated compared with 
those of other regions (figure 17).  
 
Although FDI as a share of GDP has grown since 1990 (see figure 18), the 
absolute amount is still modest at $13.3 billion in 2006 and is concentrated primarily in 
one country, South Africa, and in one line of business, extractive industries. Outside of 
FDI, migrant remittances appear to be increasing, but a large portion of the flows bypass 
formal financial channels and these remittances are difficult to account for. Exogenous 
private flows such as these could certainly become important sources of balance of 
payment finance to supplement and counter the fluctuations of foreign aid. A recent paper 
by Ratha, Mohapatra, and Plaza (2008) examines the issues and their potentials. 
 
 
Table 14: GDP Growth, Investment Rates, and ICOR 
Select Countries in Asia and Africa, 2000-06 
  GDP Growth  I/Y  ICOR 
Top Asian Performers    
China 9.5  39.7  4.2 
Cambodia 9.2  19.0  2.2 
Vietnam 7.5  33.4  4.5 
India 6.9  27.8  4.7 
Lao PDR  6.4  25.1  4.0 
      
Top African Performers      
(excl. middle inc,, oil & resource intensive ctys)   
Mozambique 7.6  26.4  3.1(5.1*) 
Tanzania 6.3  20.2  3.3 
Ethiopia 6.2  18.4  3.0 
Burkina Faso  6.1  18.5  3.3 
Uganda 5.6  20.7  3.8 
Rwanda 5.5  19.4  3.7(5.8*) 
Ghana 5.0  25.7  5.2 
      
All SSA Ave  4.9  20.5  5.5 
Note:  Figures in parenthesis include the flood year 2000 in Mozambique 
and drought year 2003 in Rwanda.  I/Y = investment as percent of GDP;  
ICOR= incremental capital-output ratio. 
Source: World Bank WDI and authors’ estimates. 
 
 
Accumulation and productivity of capital. Africa’s growth deficit in the past is 
also the product of low productivity, not just low savings and investment. Growth   38
accounting shows that physical capital per worker has grown less than 0.5 percent a year, 
half the world average. In addition, a main culprit in Africa’s disappointing growth is 
total factor productivity, which has been negative since the 1960s and −0.4 percent 
between 1990 and 2003 (Bosworth and Collins 2003). With Africa’s low productivity, it 
can be argued that low investment in Africa is not a constraint to its development 
(Devarajan, Easterly, and Pack 2003). Given the  importance of capital accumulation, 
more recent evidence about the quality and quantity of investment among some 
individual countries should be examined.  
 
For top performers in Africa, the investment rates are becoming comparable to the 
high-performing Asian countries (table 14). Ghana and Mozambique, for example, are on 
par with India and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, although their investment rates 
are still below China’s and Vietnam’s. Moreover, the aggregate efficiency of investment 
among top performers in Africa, as reflected by incremental capital-output ratios, is not 
behind that found in many Asian countries. That said, the ICORs in Africa are less stable 
and are easily affected by output variation caused by drought (Rwanda in 2003), flood 
(Mozambique in 2000), or other factors. Also, the improvement of the productivity of 
investment noted among top performers needs to spread across Africa, where the overall 
ICOR is still high at 5.5.  
 
Human capital.  Although there is evidence that the contribution of human 
capital has increased (Berthélemy and Söderling 2001), the overall record is still mixed. 
The contribution of human capital in Africa has kept pace with that in the rest of the 
world, mainly a result of rising average years of schooling, but health indicators need to 
be improved.  
 
In particular, gross primary-school enrollment rates rose from 79 percent in 1999 
to 92 percent in 2004. Health outcomes are more varied but are also improving in many 
countries. Between 1990 and 2004, the average literacy rate (in the 29 countries for 
which data exist) rose from 54 percent to 62 percent, while the range improved from 11–
81 percent to 26–87 percent. This convergence is the result of rising primary-school 
enrollments. Regionwide gross enrollment rose from 79 percent in 1999 to 92 percent in 
2004. Some 87 percent of Africans live in countries where the average enrollment rate is 
over 75 percent, and fewer than 2 percent live in countries where the rate is under 50 
percent. Six of the seven top countries worldwide with expanding primary completion 
rates (by more than 10 percent a year between 2000 and 2005) are in Africa (Benin, 
Guinea, Madagascar, Mozambique, Niger, and Rwanda). There have been no comparable 
improvements in secondary and tertiary education. Although East Asian countries 
increased secondary enrollment rates by 21 percentage points and tertiary enrollment 
rates by 12 percentage points over 12 years, Africa raised its secondary rates by only 7 
percentage points and its tertiary rates by just 1 percentage point. 
 
Africa is the only region in the world where life expectancy has declined. Life 
expectancy in the region in 1960 was 15 years below that for non-African developing 
countries. By the 1990s, it had fallen below the non-African developing-country average 
by nearly 20 years. Between 1990 and 2005, life expectancy at birth in Sub-Saharan   39
Africa declined from 49.2 years to 47.1. Although life expectancy increased in 25 
countries by an average of eight years, it declined in 21 more populous countries by an 
average of four years. HIV/AIDS, malaria, and armed conflict have contributed to the 
falling life expectancy. Progress against malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS is mixed 
but showing some positive signs. The spread of AIDS has slowed in Africa, but the 
continent still bears the brunt of the epidemic. Rapid increases in tuberculosis infections 
in Africa are linked to the greater likelihood of tuberculosis appearing from latent 
infections among HIV carriers. Malaria remains Africa’s leading killer of children under 
age five, but a strong new global partnership has formed to address the disease.  
 
HIV/AIDS threatens further progress. Africa is the only region that has 
experienced a reversal of trend in life expectancy, mostly attributable to the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic. Africans account for 60 percent of the world’s people living with HIV/AIDS. 
This fact has a profound social and economic impact, which can be seen in the large 
numbers of premature deaths of people in their prime employment, reproduction, and 
parenting years and in the large numbers of orphans that burden Africa’s families and 
economies. 
 
The blueprint for success is still not secured.  All in all, these results indicate a 
mixed picture with regard to the robustness of growth in Africa. Growth was certainly 
higher, more likely, and more widespread, and it was favored by better commodity 
prices, aid inflows, and policy, as well as by higher productivity in top performers. But 
there is no strong evidence that it was unambiguously fueled or accompanied by 
accumulation of capital, that higher productivity is spreading across all countries, and that 
export diversification has been attained. Although a group of diversified sustained 
growers is emerging, economic performance varied substantially. Certainly, the story on 
policy reforms and institutional changes is unfinished (as will be discussed further). 
Therefore, there are questions about whether the region was experiencing a robust growth 
period, despite the high growth rates. Without greater productivity and factor 
accumulation, changes in global demand for oil and metals or other external adverse 
shocks, including aid flows, could jeopardize the current growth boom. 
 
Relative to the lessons learned about avoiding mistakes, the results also indicate 
that much less is generally known about the factors and institutions for bringing about 
success in development (Dixit 2007) or policies to create greater savings rates, 
productivity, and export diversification. Institutional context, for example, can change 
incentives and reduce policy results drastically, as Easterly (2001) has argued. Although 
they are difficult to measure and quantify, there are certainly some outward signs of 
recent improvement.  
 
For example, figure 11 suggests a correlation between (1) better policy and 
institutions and (2) economic performance since 2000 for all African countries, as well as 
low-income countries, excluding oil exporters. The high growth rates in oil- and 
resource-rich countries also confirm that the management of mineral resources has 
improved and windfalls are not wasted to the same extent as in the past. Moreover, there 
are now 19 African countries adopting the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative   40
(EITI), which has the goal of verification and full publication of company and 
government revenues from oil, gas, and mining, and 6 countries have issued one or more 
EITI reports.  
 
Nonetheless, these improvements have not yet been reflected consistently in many 
governance indicators since data started becoming available. Figure 19 compares the 
governance indicators of 1996—the first year of the series—and 2006.  Actually, all 
indicators worsened. But a closer look shows that resource-rich countries—oil-rich 
countries in particular—were among the main causes of the worsening in governance and 
also that these indicators were particularly low there during growth acceleration. These 
results highlight the importance of the political economy issues associated with mineral- 
and oil-rich countries in Africa as found in the recent empirical literature (see, for 
example, Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido 1999; Dufrénot, Sanon, and Diop 2006; Ndulu et 




IV.  Key Areas of Actions to Sustain Growth 
 
The avoidance of economic collapses will continue to depend on good policy, leadership, 
and aid. To sustain an accelerating growth, however, the region will have to tackle 
several barriers and constraints to greater productivity and investment. Addressing these 
barriers will require both continuing reforms and greater external assistance.  
 
Firm studies such as Eifert, Gelb, and Ramachandran (2005) highlight one of the 
barriers to greater productivity. Research shows that efficient African enterprises can 
compete with Chinese and Indian firms in factory floor costs (figure 20). They become 
less competitive, though, because of higher indirect business costs, including 
infrastructure (figure 21). In China, indirect costs are about 8 percent of total costs, but in 
African countries they are 18–35 percent.  
 
Building the African private sector will be crucial both for growth and for 
fostering a national consensus for growth-oriented policies. Improving the investment 
climate and enhancing the capacity of African entrepreneurs to invest and engage in 
business are central to this effort.  
 
Africa remains a high-cost, high-risk place to do business. Overall, the cost of 
doing business in Africa is 20–40 percent above that for other developing regions, 
including the costs associated with bureaucracy, corruption, risk, and essential business 
services (figure 22). During 2006/07, the average rank of African countries was 136 in 
the Doing Business indicators (figure 23), but four middle-income countries rank in the 
top third: Mauritius, 32; South Africa, 35; Namibia 43; and Botswana, 51. Value-chain 
analysis by Subramanian and Matthijs (2007) also indicated several choke points in the 
supply chain for African firms: high cost of import logistics and time, low speed to 
market delivery, high cost of export logistics, and high incidence of rejects.    41
 
Figure 19: Governance indicators scores (-2.5 to +2.5) 
1996 and 2005 
 
 
Figure 20: Factor floor costs in Sub-Saharan Africa 







































































Source: Arbache and Page (2007a).  Data from the World Bank various years 
i.  
Source: Cadot and Nasir (2001). 
 
Figure 21:  Nett productivity is lower than "factory floor" 
(gross) productivity due to high costs of doing business 
 
Figure 22: African firms are sharply disadvantaged by 












































































Source: Eifert, Gelb, and 
Ramachandran (2005).




The picture is somewhat brighter for additional reforms, albeit still uneven. Forty-
six Sub-Saharan countries introduced at least one business environment reform in 
2006/07, and Ghana and Kenya were among the top 10 reformers (Tanzania was also on 
the list in 2005/06). Kenya rose from 82 to 72, and Ghana from 109 to 87. But all others 
had ranks of 90 or higher. Nonetheless, several countries saw improvements: 
Mozambique went from 140 to 134, Madagascar from 160 to 149, and Burkina Faso from   42
161 to 165. In 2005/06, the region came in third behind Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries with regard to 
countries that made at least one positive reform. 
 
Improving the performance of Africa’s financial systems is also high on the 
agenda for enterprise development. Firms in Africa identify financing constraints as even 
more severe than lack of infrastructure in limiting their business development. 
 
 
Figure 23:  Africa is the least business friendly in 2007 
 
Figure 24: Alleviating domestic constraints could 













































































Source: Broadman et al. (2007) 
 
Figure 25:  Lack of infrastructure is a key bottleneck 
 
Figure 26:  The time to clear goods at ports is several 
days in many countries in Africa 
 
 
Source: World Bank various years g. 
 
 
Source: World Bank various years c. 
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Closing the infrastructure gap.   An export push requires an infrastructure push 
in Africa, because many of the bottlenecks pertain to lack of infrastructure (figure 24 and 
25). Sub-Saharan Africa lags at least 20 percentage points behind the average for 
International Development Association countries on almost all major infrastructure 
measures.
36 In addition, quality of service is low, supplies are unreliable, and disruptions 
are frequent and unpredictable (figure 26)—all pushing up production costs, a critical 
impediment for investors (table 15). There are also large inequities in access to household 
infrastructure services, with coverage rates in rural areas lagging those in urban areas. 
The region’s unmet infrastructure needs are estimated at $22 billion a year (5 percent of 
GDP), plus another $17 billion for operations and maintenance.  
 








Delay in obtaining electricity connection (days)  79.9  27.5
Electrical outages (days per year)  90.9  28.7
Value of lost output due to electrical outages (percent of turnover)  6.1  4.4
Firms maintaining own generation equipment (percent of total)  47.5  31.8
Telecommunications 
Delay in obtaining telephone line (days)  96.6  43.0
Telephone outages (days per year)  28.1  9.1
Note: Data for Sub-Saharan Africa are for 6 countries; data for developing countries are 
for 55 countries. 
Source: World Bank Investment Climate Assessments. 
 
Recent progress is encouraging. Except roads, indicators of infrastructure access 
rose between the 1990s and 2000s (table 16). The Africa Partnership Forum reported 
steady improvements in effectively using existing infrastructure and in increasing public 
investments. Countries are also undertaking regulatory and policy reforms, especially for 
water, telecommunications, and transport (Africa Partnership Forum 2006b). Twenty of 
the largest African countries have or are formulating reform agendas for water and 
sanitation. 
 
                                                 
36 An important exception is the penetration of fixed-line and mobile telephones, where Sub-Saharan Africa 
leads low-income countries by as much as 13 percent. The largest gaps are for rural roads (29 percentage 
points) and electricity (21 percentage points).   44
Table 16: Improvements in African infrastructure access 
Service  1990s  2000s  Percent 
change 
Telephone (per 1,000 people)  21  90  328.6 
Improved water (percent of households)  55  65  18.1 
Improved sanitation (percent of households)  31  37  19.3 
Grid electricity (percent of households)  16  23  43.8 
    Source: World Bank 2006a. 
 
Compared with other regions, Africa has been slow to mobilize the private sector 
for the provision and financing of infrastructure. The Infrastructure Consortium reports 
that private sector interest has gradually spread. There is an upward trend in private 
sector provision and management of infrastructure, which stood at $6 billion in 2006, up 
from $4 billion in 2004. Most private flows (84 percent) go to telecommunications and 
energy. Concessions have now been awarded to operate and rehabilitate many African 
ports and railways and some power distribution enterprises, but financial commitments 
by the concessionaire companies are often small. The small commitments reflect both the 
value of the management improvements that the concessionaire is expected to bring and 
the limited scale and profitability of the enterprises taken over. An important facilitator in 
some cases has been the insurance instruments developed over the past 15 years by such 
bodies as the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation and the Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency and by the World Bank’s Partial Risk Guarantee offerings. 
 
There has been significant progress in information and communication 
technology. Access to communications services has increased dramatically over the past 
three years, with the proportion of the population (excluding South Africa) living under 
the mobile telephone footprint rising from 3 percent in 1999 to 50 percent in 2006. This 
increase has been matched by an equally rapid increase in the use of communications 
services. By the end of 2006, there were 123 million mobile subscribers. Average 
penetration rates in the region doubled between 2004 and 2006 to reach 16 percent.  
  
Integrating the region’s economies. The small size of African economies and the 
fact that many countries are landlocked call for regional approaches to common 
problems: infrastructure in trade corridors; common institutional and legal frameworks 
(customs administration, competition policy, regulation of common property resources, 
such as fisheries); and transborder solutions to regional health issues.  
 
African leaders have become more aware of the benefits of regional approaches, 
especially in matters related to trade and infrastructure. The New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development has adopted regional integration as one of its core objectives, and the 
African Union is leading efforts to rationalize regional economic communities. Most 
countries in Africa are party to multiple treaties or conventions addressing joint 
development and management of shared water resources (including navigation and 
fisheries), hydropower, trade corridors, irrigation, and flood control. Progress has been 
most notable in regional infrastructure, particularly regional power pools (in West Africa 
and southern Africa) and in launching customs unions (in West Africa, East Africa, and 
southern Africa). Progress on regional infrastructure is slowed by the technical 
complexity of multicountry projects and the time required for decisions by multiple   45
governments. There is less progress in creating regional approaches to education and in 
systematically addressing regional health issues.  
 
Making agriculture more productive. Sustained growth that reduces rural poverty 
will require that more countries achieve 5 percent annual growth in agricultural value 
added. Although growth in agricultural value added has been strong since 2000, 
averaging 4.6 percent in 2004, too little of it has come from higher productivity or 
yields.
37 Although land productivity is increasing in 38 of 46 countries, only 6 have a rate 
of increase of 5 percent or more.
38 Labor productivity is increasing in 29 countries, with 
10 achieving increases of 3 percent a year or higher.
39  
 
Productivity growth will require an expansion of irrigated areas, as well as better 
performance of rain-fed agriculture. But less than 4 percent of cultivated land is irrigated. 
Because of the long lead time before investments are completed and operational, this 
proportion changed little in recent years. Improvements in management of soil fertility 
have been slow, as has been the adoption of better seeds. Spending for agricultural 
research and technology remains low, although it is starting to increase along with overall 
spending on agricultural programs in the region (Africa Partnership Forum 2006a). On a 
positive note, there has been an increase in the use of water management techniques 
(water harvesting, reduced tillage). 
 
Using natural resource rents well  Resource-based rents are widespread and 
growing because of new discoveries and favorable prices. During the 1990s, 65 percent 
of all FDI was concentrated in oil, gas, and mining. Between 2000 and 2010, $200 billion 
in oil revenue will accrue to African governments. The 2004 oil windfall alone on 
average resulted in a 26 percent increase in government revenue in oil-exporting 
countries.  
 
However, in Africa, mineral-dependent countries tend to do worse in social 
indicators than non-mineral countries at the same income level, including having higher 
poverty rates, greater income inequality, less spending on health care, higher prevalence 
of child malnutrition, and lower literacy and school enrollments. But mineral-exporting 
economies can achieve shared growth. Indonesia, and Malaysia have all used natural 
resource wealth to provide a basis for a more diversified economy in which the poor have 








                                                 
37 Growth in Angola, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, the Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Tanzania has been through an expansion of cropped area. 
38 This rate is the five-year moving average based on 2001–05. 
39 This rate is the five-year moving average based on 2000–04.   46




































         Source: World Bank. 
 
Elements of a strategy for mineral revenue management include the following: 
 
•  Promote transparency in accounting for revenues by adopting the EITI. 
 
•  Establish fiscal rules, including setting savings rules and maintaining fiscal discipline 
in decentralized fiscal systems. 
 
•  Strengthen public financial management and the Medium Term Expenditure 
Framework. 
 
•  Monitor and evaluate outcomes. 
 
See also the papers by Devlin and Lewin (2008) and Budina and van Wijnbergen (2008) 
for further discussion on fiscal management of oil revenue and the case of Nigeria.  
 
Increasing regional and global support. Developing and implementing regional 
strategies for increasing connectivity to the world and within Africa are crucial. Cross-
country infrastructure projects are particularly important, but so too are institutional 
reforms, such as common customs procedures, that lower transactions costs. 
Complementary action by the global development community to reduce barriers to trade 
and to scale up aid to enhance the region’s capacity to trade is also required. 
 
 
V.  Sharing the Benefits of Growth  
 
Growth alone will not be enough to reach the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
for Africa. At the same time that Africa’s governments are pursuing a new growth 
strategy—and with the same vigor—they will also need to focus on delivering more and 
better services for human development. 
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Many MDGs will not be met. Despite the recent good performance, Africa’s GDP 
per capita is still 50 percent of the level of East Asia (figure 28), and the growth rate is far 
short of the 7 percent needed if poverty is to be halved by 2015. The mean 
income/expenditure of the poor, those earning less than one PPP dollar a day, is much 
lower in Africa than in East Asia or South Asia (figure 29).  Africa is far behind all other 
regions in terms of the UN human development index (figure 30). It will also remain 
behind on most MDGs (figure 31); if current trends continue, it will not meet the 2015 
targets. In 1990, 47 percent of Africans lived in poverty. In 2004, 41 percent did, and 





Figure 28: Per capita GDP of  
SSA, East Asia and Low income group 
 
 
Figure 29: Average expenditure of the poor 
 
 
Source: World Bank  various years d, various years g.  
 
 
Source: World Bank  various years f. 
 
Figure 30:  The Human Development Index 
 
Figure 31: The gap between the MDG Goals 
and projected levels given current trends 
 
 
Source: UNDP 2006. 
 
 
Source: World Bank 2007b.   48
Although Sub-Saharan Africa is one of two regions not expected to reach most of 
the MDGs by 2015 (the other is South Asia), there is substantial variation among 
countries in both the level of attainment of the goals and the pace of progress. Mauritius 
has met four goals. Botswana has met three and will likely meet one more. And South 
Africa has met three. Among other countries, 9 will meet two goals, and 13 will meet at 
least one. But despite better progress—especially in education, malaria, and HIV/AIDS—
23 African countries are unlikely to meet any of the MDGs. Scaling up the efforts on 
MDGs presents several challenges in low-income country and a recent paper by Lofgren 
and Diaz-Bonilla (2008) examines the trade-offs and scenarios in the case of Ethiopia. 
 
Sharing the benefits of public services will be key.  Africa has the lowest and 
most unequal access to essential services. In the 1960s and into the 1970s, many African 
countries widened access to essential social services and saw significant improvements in 
many social indicators. However, this progress did not prove sustainable. Africa has the 
lowest access to all essential services. Service delivery is costly for African governments 
because of long distances and sparsely populated areas. 
 
The rural populations have extremely limited access to services of decent quality, 
including education, health care, safe drinking water, paved roads, and 
telecommunications. They also lack access to factors of production, such as means of 
transportation, fertilizer, and improved seeds. 
 
Women in Africa provide more than half the region’s labor but lack equal access 
to education and factors of production. Gender differentials in the areas of labor force 
participation and labor productivity are constraints to economic growth. A study in 
Kenya, for example, concluded that giving women farmers the same level of agricultural 
inputs and education as men could increase their yields by more than 20 percent. 
 
 
Service delivery must reach the poor, rural populations, and women. African 
rural populations and the poor have a distinct disadvantage in their access to services 
(figure 32). To build and sustain service delivery, African countries will need to do the 
following: 
•  Improve social sector policies. 
 
•  Strengthen financial management and costing. 
 
•  Decentralize service delivery, capacity building, and training. 
 
•  Integrate sectors into multisectoral budgetary programming to underpin the 
implementation of the national poverty reduction strategy. 
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Figure 32 Rural-urban gaps in access to services 
 





















































































Source: World Bank Africa Region. 
 
Since 1999, when the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) became the key policy 
framework for development partners, many African governments have consciously 
started to invest more in pro-poor service delivery, especially in the areas of health, 
education, HIV/AIDS, rural development (roads), agriculture, and water (figure 33).  
 
 
Figure 33 Pro-poor spending as percent of total government spending, 1999 and 2004 
 
Data sources: Country PRSPs. 
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VI.   So, Is Africa at a turning point?  
 
Based on the records, the verdict is guarded. There is indeed an acceleration of growth in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, but its sustainability is fragile. African countries in general are 
increasingly able to avoid mistakes and economic collapses, but increasing and sustaining 
growth are a difficult challenge. In the short to medium term, much depends on the 
continuation of favorable terms of trade, aid, and debt relief, as well as good policy. In 
the medium to long term, it is essential to raise the economic fundamentals, which are 
still lagging. Particularly needed are higher exports, more private sector growth, greater 
productivity of investment, higher foreign investment and remittances from migrant 
workers, greater regional efforts at tackling the infrastructure gaps, and improved 
agriculture. These economic fundamentals can be raised through continuing reforms and 
improved governance. In the long term, there is no substitute for improving human 
development and sharing the benefits of growth.  
 
Predictions of Africa’s imminent recovery or demise have proved wrong on 
numerous occasions in the past 40 years. Some of its economies have been badly 
managed and have declined, whereas others have prospered. But the energy, imagination, 
and entrepreneurship of its people have overcome both limited opportunities and bad 
policies to place the region at a position in this new century where better governments 
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